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Deciding who should define takings, especially regulatory tak-
ings,' is a daunting task. It is daunting because years of effort
by all three branches of the federal government have failed to
produce an effective solution. For very different reasons, each
branch has failed to develop a sound approach to regulatory tak-
ings.2 It is also daunting because the definition of a regulatory
taking is so fundamentally important to the future of our eco-
nomic, legal, political, and natural systems' that it may require
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1. The term "regulatory takings" refers generally to takings resulting from
regulatory conduct that restricts private property in such a way that the owner no
longer can exercise the rights that he or she legitimately and reasonably expected to
have. The Supreme Court first announced the notion that regulatory conduct could
go too far under the Takings Clause in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Parts I and II.
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the wisdom of Solomon to resolve.
Which branch, then, should define when a taking occurs be-
cause of regulatory conduct? The response will depend on the
values and purposes that an individual attaches to the Takings
Clause4 and on the expectations that an individual has for the
takings decision-making process.5 The response of Professor Pe-
ter Byrne and others is that the regulatory takings doctrine
raises utilitarian issues best handled by the democratically ac-
countable legislative branch.6 My response is that the branch
best able to provide principled decision making should handle
the regulatory takings problem. As used in this Article, the
phrase "principled decision making" refers to decision making
that is principled in the sense of process, and not necessarily in
the sense of providing a unified or coherent set of substantive
principles-that is, decision making that is objective and neutral
and not controlled by the personal interests or beliefs of the
decisionmaker or the parties directly affected by the decision.!
What explains the inherently different approaches to solving
the regulatory takings problem? Perhaps fundamentally differ-
ent expectations about what a solution can or should accomplish
explain the differences. In any event, my suggestion to focus on
the branch best able to engage in principled decision making
results in part from previous unsuccessful attempts by all three
branches of the federal government to address the regulatory
takings problem. Those unsuccessful attempts have convinced
me that the problem is far too complex to yield a single substan-
tive solution or a coherent set of principles. I am therefore much
4. The Takings, or Just Compensation, Clause appears in the Fifth Amend-
ment and provides: "[Nior shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory
Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89 (1995); see also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULA-
TORY TAKINGS (1995) (questioning the legitimacy and efficacy of judicial review of
regulatory takings issues involving the economic powers of the state); William Mi-
chael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of Takings, and Compensa-
tion Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1151, 1156-58 (1997) (proposing a partial leg-
islative solution).
7. See infra Part II.
8. For a discussion of some of those unsuccessful attempts, see infra Part II.
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more willing to focus on the takings decision-making process and
on a branch's capacity for principled decision making in deter-
mining which branch should have primary responsibility for de-
fining regulatory takings.
This Article focuses on the problem of choosing the appropri-
ate decisionmaker for regulatory takings issues. To support my
conclusion that the judicial branch should be the primary tak-
ings decisionmaker, Part I of the Article reiterates the constitu-
tional dimensions of the regulatory takings problem. In addition
to discussing why government action that excessively regulates
property poses a constitutional takings issue even though the
action is otherwise a valid exercise of the police power, Part I
examines the potential for political process unfairness to proper-
ty owners, a central concern of the Takings Clause.' Then, in
Part II, the Article addresses each branch's role in defining reg-
ulatory takings-a topic of much debate in this Symposium is-
sue.10 This Part first makes the case for judicial branch resolu-
tion of regulatory takings issues and then examines the case
against choosing the legislative or executive branch as the pri-
mary regulatory takings decisionmaker." Each discussion ex-
plains why the judiciary is the branch best able to engage in
principled decision making and to avoid the politics of takings.
Finally, Part III summarizes the conclusions of the Article and
introduces the main themes of this Symposium issue.
9. An in-depth discussion of the nature of the political process concerns ad-
dressed by the Takings Clause is beyond the scope of this Article. For a more de-
tailed discussion of the role of the Takings Clause in preventing or minimizing polit-
ical process failure, see Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9
CONST. COMMENTARY 279 (1992); William A. Fischel, Exploring the Kozinski Paradox:
Why Is More Efficient Regulation a Taking of Property?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 865
(1991); Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285
(1990); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782 (1995).
10. See, e.g., Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings Jurisprudence
Meets the Endangered Species Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825 (1997) (discussing
the political function of the Supreme Court in endangered species protection);
Treanor, supra note 6, at 1156-58 (proposing a partial legislative solution).
11. For other views on the appropriate role of the different branches in resolv-
ing regulatory takings, see Byrne, supra note 6 (arguing that the Court's regulatory
takings doctrine should be replaced with a legislative solution); Treanor, supra note
6, at 1158-60 (supporting greater legislative branch involvement).
1997]
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF THE REGULATORY
TAKINGS PROBLEM
In his 1995 article in Ecology Law Quarterly, Professor Peter
Byrne argued that the regulatory takings doctrine should be
abolished and that the legislative process should instead be used
to resolve the essentially utilitarian issues raised by the doc-
trine. 2 As support for this conclusion, he described the morass
into which the doctrine had taken the courts," the lack of tex-
tual, precedental, or utilitarian support for the doctrine, 4 the
failure of the doctrine to promote economic efficiency, 5 and the
illegitimate and unwise use of the doctrine to curb environmen-
tal protection efforts. 6 He also asserted that federal court en-
forcement of the doctrine against the states "upsets appropriate
notions of federalism" 7 because it impairs the states' "authority
to adjust the limits of property interests created by the states
themselves ... ."8 At the very least, this impairment suggests
the "need for a stronger justification for the exercise of national
power." 9 Professor Byrne's suggested legislative solution basi-
cally would provide a developer with a property right in develop-
ment plans upon the issuance of a crucial permit." To "allow
government to respond to changes in circumstances and overall
goals," he proposed that a reasonable time limit be imposed on
the permit and therefore on the property right.2' The "thrust"
of his statutory solution "would be to give property status to the
approved development plan at a clear point in the process, so
that non-excepted subsequent prohibitions on completion would
require payment of compensation."22
To accept some of Professor Byrne's arguments in support of
12. Byrne, supra note 6, at 89-90.
13. See id. at 102-06.
14. See id. at 91-102, 115-17.
15. See id. at 123-28.
16. See id. at 117-23, 131-36.
17. Id. at 111.
18. Id. at 112.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 140.
21. See id.
22. Id.
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his solution would require denying the constitutional dimension
of the regulatory takings problem. Original understandings of
the Takings Clause admittedly did not consider police power
regulation to pose a serious takings problem.' Courts focused
on whether the challenged police power action involved a physi-
cal appropriation and generally were not concerned about the
regulation of property, not even when the regulation had a sig-
nificant economic impact.' Despite those original understand-
ings, though, the drafters of the Takings Clause and the early
courts that interpreted the clause surely could not have antici-
pated the degree of regulation that exists currently, especially in
the environmental area. Because clean air, clean water, trees,
fisheries, wildfowl, and other natural resources were overwhelm-
ingly abundant in the 1700s and 1800s, there was minimal need
to understand the adverse environmental impact of land use.'
23. See William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 708 (1985).
24. See id. at 695-98, 711; see also Byrne, supra note 6, at 91-96 (discussing
the original intent and early judicial interpretation of the Takings Clause); Treanor,
supra note 9, at 792-97 (discussing early interpretations of the Takings Clause and
of state counterparts); cf JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER
RIGHT 9, 25, 48, 59-61, 155 (1992) (recognizing that property rights were not invio-
late and yielded to social and economic needs, but also that property included cer-
tain fundamental economic interests).
25. Early settlers wrote in glowing terms of the abundance and beauty of natural
resources in America. See, e.g., Letter from William Brewster to the Earl of Salisbury,
reprinted in ALEXANDER BROWN, THE FIRST REPUBLIC IN AMERICA 33 (1898) (describing
the "most statlye, Riche Kingdom in the woorld"); BROWN, supra, at 34-37 (reprinting an
unattributed early description of the fish, types of land, woods, soil, and other riches of
Virginia); THE TRUE TRAVELS, ADVENTURES AND OBSERVATIONS OF CAFrAIN JOHN SMITH
94 (E.A Benians ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1908) (writing that "heaven and earth nev-
er agreed better to frame a place for man's habitation" than in Virginia); see generally 1
PHILIP ALEXANDER BRUCE, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF VIRGINIA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTU-
RY 71-139 (1907) (describing the physical character of "aboriginal Virginia"). Some schol-
ars have maintained that this abundance of resources affected the development of public
and private rights in America's resources. See LYNDA L. BUTLER & MARGIT LIVINGSTON,
VIRGINIA TIDAL AND COASTAL LAW § 6.2 (1988). Because of Virginia's abundant resourc-
es, development of the commons concept, which recognizes certain public rights in natu-
ral resources, was more restrained in Virginia than in England. See id. The development
of private land rights, by contrast, was promoted by the abundance of natural resources,
which created expectations of being able to acquire land that was free of most traditional
English law constraints. See id. § 8.1.
Colonial and early statehood governments did, of course, regulate natural resources.
Early on, for example, Virginia adopted measures to govern and protect its abundant
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Furthermore, the problem of excessive or abusive governmental
regulation of property by laws that otherwise are valid exercises
of the police power seems to raise precisely the type of constitu-
tional concerns that the Takings Clause should address." The
concern expressed by the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,' that government may go too far in regulating proper-
ty," is exactly the type of concern that courts existing in a mod-
ern regulatory state should consider under the Takings Clause.
The Court should not, as a matter of constitutional takings doc-
trine, allow government to regulate property so extensively that
the market value of the property is driven down to a point at
which government can condemn the property at a bargain rate.29
Treating such excessive regulation of property as equivalent to
a physical appropriation seems to logically extend the traditional
concepts of eminent domain and of property law. If government
were not prevented by the Court's takings jurisprudence from
adopting regulations that were valid exercises of the police power
but that went too far in burdening private property, government
would rarely, if ever, need to exercise its power of condemnation.
It could simply over-regulate a tract of land until the market
value fell to a point at which the landowner would prefer to sell
natural resources. During the period between 1678 and 1680, for instance, a Middlesex
County court decided to protect fisheries by enjoining the spearing of fish. See John C.
Pearson, The Fish and Fisheries of Colonial Virginia, 23 WM. & MARY Q.2D 278, 280
(1943). Spear-fishing apparently wounded four times more fish than it captured. See id.
(quoting Middlesex County Court Records, 1677-78, reprinted in 8 VA. MAG. HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 186 (1900)). For other examples of laws regulating Virginia's natural resourc-
es, see BUTLER & LIVINGSTON, supra, § 6.2 (discussing regulation of common rights and
uses in Colonial Virginia), id. § 7.3 (discussing regulation of water-related uses in Colo-
nial Virginia), id. ch. 8 (discussing regulations affecting distribution of private interests
in land), id. § 9.2 (discussing Virginia's enclosure laws for open lands). These regulatory
measures, however, did not reflect a deep or systematic commitment to the health of the
environment. For an interesting discussion of the ecological changes resulting from Euro-
pean colonization of New England, see WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND (1983).
26. Whenever the phrase "excessive or abusive government regulation of prop-
erty" is used in this Article, it refers to losses and burdens imposed on private prop-
erty by regulatory conduct that generally is valid under constitutional provisions oth-
er than the Takings Clause.
27. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
28. See id. at 415.
29. See id. at 413 (stating that government is limited in how much it can de-
crease the value of property before compensation is necessary).
[Vol. 38:749754
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the property and government was one of the few parties interest-
ed in buying the property. Such manipulation of market value to
circumvent the need for condemnation would be inconsistent with
the just compensation constraint imposed on government's emi-
nent domain power." The same constitutional values of fairness,
distributive justice, and freedom from majoritarian exploitation
that underlie physical appropriations surely exist in cases of ex-
cessive or abusive government regulation of property.3' These
values do not just involve the problem of surprise resulting when
a property owner buys land with the expectation of developing it
for a profit only to discover that new government regulations
prevent development.32 The values also focus on the unfairness
and outrageousness of being singled out and forced to bear the
costs of government action and of being subjected to
disproportionately burdensome government action.3
Furthermore, property law already has numerous doctrines
that treat one situation as equivalent to another, despite the ab-
sence of key characteristics or even the ultimate fact, because of
30. James Madison, in an essay written after ratification of the Bill of Rights,
urged a broad reading of the Fifth Amendment to include protection from indirect,
as well as direct, infringements of property. See James Madison, Property, NATL GA-
ZErlE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266-68 (Rob-
ert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983).
31. Although scholars and jurists disagree about the principles and standards
that should govern takings disputes, they tend to agree on some of the general val-
ues and purposes of the clause. See Treanor, supra note 6, at 1151-55. For some ex-
amples of different theories of takings law, see BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPER-
TY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); FISCHEL, supra note 6; Gregory S.
Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752 (1988); C.
Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U.
PA. L. REv. 741 (1986); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Com-
ments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1165 (1967); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE
L.J. 149 (1971).
32. Cf. Byrne, supra note 6, at 130 (discussing the unfairness of surprise as
one key argument for constitutional protection of property owners).
33. In Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), the Supreme Court ex-
plained that the Takings Clause was "designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole." Id. at 49; see also Michehnan, supra note 31, at
1214-24 (discussing the ethical and utilitarian justifications for the Takings Clause,
including the problems of demoralization and systematic exploitation).
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the importance of promoting fundamental principles or policies of
property law. Under landlord/tenant law, for example, courts
routinely recognize that a landlord's interference with a residen-
tial tenant's use and enjoyment of the leasehold premises can be
functionally equivalent to an actual eviction.14 When the inter-
ference is serious or substantial, the tenant may no longer be
able to enjoy or use the property and thus, for all practical pur-
poses, is evicted.35 Additionally, under the law of gifts, courts
treat delivery of the sole means of access and control of personal
property as being equivalent to the actual manual transfer of the
property." Courts typically explain that the functions and poli-
cies of the delivery requirement are served, so long as a donor
gives up dominion and control over her property. 7
The absence of political process unfairness to property owners
similarly is not a convincing reason to conclude that the regula-
tory takings problem is without constitutional dimension."
Many property owners admittedly have significant impact on the
political process.39 That these property owners do not suffer
34. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 6.32-.33
(2d ed. 1993).
35. See id.
36. See RALPH E. BOYER ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.3 (4th ed. 1991).
37. See id.
38. Some scholars might even dispute the absence of political process unfair-
ness to property owners, at least since the New Deal era when government began to
increase its regulation of property and economic interests significantly. See ELY, su-
pra note 24, at 8-9, 119-34, 153-54; see also Herman Belz, Property and Liberty Re-
considered, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1015, 1022 (1992) (reviewing JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE
GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT:. A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
(1992)). But see Treanor, supra note 9, at 855-87 (arguing that the Takings Clause
should be reinterpreted to protect property only when process unfairness is likely).
39. See Byrne, supra note 6, at 129-30. Private property holdings provide an impor-
tant resource base for state and local governments. Statistics for 1992, for example, indi-
cate that state and local governments received about $179 billion of their $1.185 trillion
in total revenues from property taxes, or approximately 15% of their total revenues.
Local governments alone received about $172 billion of the property tax revenues, which
amounted to almost 27% of their total revenues ($648 billion). See BUREAU OF THE CEN-
sus, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1995, at 299 (115th ed. 1995) [hereinafter 1995 CENSUS]. Furthermore, significant in-
creases in certain types of real property have occurred. Occupied housing units, for ex-
ample, have risen from 42,826,000 units in 1950 to 80,390,000 units in 1980 and
94,724,000 units in 1993, with 55% of those units having been occupied in 1950, 64.4%
having been occupied in 1980, and 64.7% having been occupied in 1993. See id. at 735.
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from widespread bias within the political process is as likely due
to the effective incorporation of the property concept into the
fabric of our constitutional and political structure0 as it is due
to the ability of property owners to impact the political process
itself.4' Furthermore, though the class of property owners in
the United States may be relatively large, .the nature of property
interests varies significantly.42 Although some property owners
Additionally, total housing units have risen from 45,983,000 units in 1950 to 86,759,000
units in 1980 and 106,611,000 units in 1993. The number of detached housing units
alone has increased from 29,116,000 units in 1950 to 53,596,000 units in 1980 and
64,283,000 units in 1993. See id. at 733.
Supporters of the private property movement have gained significant power in re-
cent years. See Betsy Carpenter, This Land Is My Land, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar.
14, 1994, at 65. According to some experts, the private property movement primarily
represents wealthy landowners and benefits from the lobbying efforts of rich special
interest groups. See id. at 68-69; see also infra note 52 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the private property movement). But see H. Jane Lehman, Private Property Rights
Proponents Gain Ground, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1994, at El (discussing three flanks to
the private property movement, including one composed of small property owners). For
further discussion of the nature of the property rights and related wise-use movements,
see LET THE PEOPLE JUDGE (John D. Echeverria & Raymond Booth Eby eds., 1995).
40. According to Professor Jennifer Nedelsky, the Madisonians, for example, en-
sured that election districts were sufficiently large to make the election of property
owners likely. See generally JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS
OF AMERICAN CONST1TUTIONALISM 53-54, 170-87, 199-207, 215-18 (1990) (discussing
the importance of property as a concept in the history of the Constitution).
41. For an interesting discussion of property as a reflection of traditional Amer-
ican values, see Jon Roush, Introduction: Freedom and Responsibility: What We Can
Learn from the Wise Use Movement, in LET THE PEOPLE JUDGE, supra -note 39, at 1, 2-3.
42. See Byrne, supra note 6, at 129. Statistics from the 1995 census demonstrate
the large size and diversity of the "residential property" category used in the census.
Statistics for 1993, for instance, reveal a total of 106,611,000 housing units, with
61,252,000 of the occupied units being owned (57.5%), 33,472,000 of the occupied units
being rented (31.4%), and 8,799,000 of the total housing units standing vacant (8.3%).
1995 CENSUS, supra note 39, at 737. The 1993 statistics also classify housing units ac-
cording to the following categories: single-family detached unit, single-family attached
unit, mobile home or trailer, 2 to 4 units, 5 to 9 units, 10 to 19 units, 20 to 49 units,
or 50 or more units. See id. Those categories then are classified according to the type
of main heating equipment used, the presence of air conditioning, the source of water,
and the means of sewage disposal. See id. Further, in addition to these categories,
multi-unit structures are classified according to the number of stories built within the
structure, and single-family units are distinguished according to the type of foundation
used. See id.
The variation in the nature of residential property, however, does not necessarily
result in significant diversity among the types of property owners. Indeed, some evi-
dence indicates a trend toward monopolization of land ownership. According to one
scholar, 5% of landowners in the country hold title to 75% of the land that is privately
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
have both the financial resources and the opportunity to impact
the political process, many others lack both.43 Political process
fairness to wealthy or commercial property owners should not
serve as the benchmark for determining the need for constitu-
tional protection of property rights. Indeed, judgments regarding
the lack of a political process reason for protecting property
owners from regulatory conduct through the Takings Clause
seem to run contrary to the fundamental purpose of the clause:
to protect individual property owners from majoritarian exploita-
tion.44 As Professor James Ely has explained: "Much legislation
frankly seeks to achieve a wider distribution of wealth by di-
vesting owners of their right to use property to its maximum
advantage and by altering contractual arrangements. Such op-
portunistic behavior is less painful to lawmakers than levying
taxes to finance governmental programs."45
Further, even if majoritarian exploitation of property owners
is not a problem now, it could become a problem in the future.46
As traditional property distinctions fade in response to the blur-
ring of public and private spheres and to greater recognition of
land's ecological value, the problem of governmental abuse "may
well become more intense."47 Furthermore, if significantly more
restrictive limits are placed on campaign spending, then election
politics could change drastically, shifting the emphasis to name
recognition and identification with the masses.4" Coupling such
owned. See Carpenter, supra note 39, at 69.
43. See Carpenter, supra note 39, at 69.
44. See ELY, supra note 24, at 155; Michelman, supra note 31, at 1216-17. But
see Treanor, supra note 9, at 855-87 (arguing that the Takings Clause and the origi-
nal understandings of the clause now require reinterpretation in light of modern cir-
cumstances to allow compensation to be paid only when political process unfairness
is likely and not necessarily when traditional jurisprudence and understandings
support compensation).
45. ELY, supra note 24, at 155. Professor Ely rejects the notion that the eco-
nomic values underlying property rights should be "left entirely to the political pro-
cess[,1" because then property ownership would be "simply a matter of legislative
sufferance." Id. Such an approach thus would ignore the utilitarian and libertarian
need for constitutional protection of property and economic rights. See id.
46. Madison's unease about the "future security of property" motivated him to
push for greater constitutional protection of property. See id. at 53-54.
47. Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1454 (1993).
48. See generally Marty Jezer & Ellen Miller, Money Politics: Campaign Finance
[Vol. 38:749758
19971 APPROPRIATE DECISIONMAKER 759
limits with increased access to the information superhighway
would provide a less expensive method of gaining political sup-
port and would therefore make the election of citizens with lim-
ited income or property more likely.49 An absence of political
process unfairness to property owners thus does not justify judi-
cial indifference to the problem of political unfairness in inter-
preting and applying the Takings Clause.5"
Finally, those scholars who reduce the regulatory takings
problem to a utilitarian equation5 miss one of the key points of
the private property rights movement. More than mere desire to
protect economic interests drives grassroot supporters of that
movement; an unwavering belief in the fundamental importance
of property rights to personal liberty and to our political and
constitutional structure also motivates them.52 That this belief
and the Subversion of American Democracy, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY
467 (1994) (arguing that the very wealthy exert disproportionate control over politics);
David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1369 (1994) (describing the inequality and coercion inherent in current campaign
finance laws); Bruce B. Auster & David Bowermaster, Playing the Money Game: The
Nation's Campaign Finance Laws Are Full of Loopholes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May
20, 1996, at 24-26 (discussing ways in which campaign supporters avoid the campaign
finance laws in order to donate to their candidate's election). For examples of recent
attempts to amend campaign finance laws, see H.R. 3505, 104th Cong. (1996) (including
a bill to amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 by rewriting the provisions
governing spending and benefits in congressional campaigns, among other items); H.R.
3208, 104th Cong. (1996) (including a bill to amend the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971 to limit contributions and loans to candidates in elections for the House of Repre-
sentatives, among other changes); H.R. 1427, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposing a bill to
amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to control House of Representatives
campaign spending); S. 1219, 104th Cong. (1995) (including a bill to reform the financing
of federal elections by limiting the spending and benefits in Senate elections, among
other changes).
49. Cf. Jezer & Miller, supra note 48, at 492.
50. The conflict between property and democracy becomes the basis of Professor
Ely's determination that the Supreme Court must play a key role in "carefully ad-
just[ing] the demands of political democracy with the explicit protection of property
ownership contained in the Constitution." ELY, supra note 24, at 154.
51. See Byrne, supra note 6; supra text accompanying note 12.
52. 'As a representative of the National Cattlemen's Association explained in
addressing the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works:
At the root of the current dissatisfaction among property owners is the envi-
ronmental statutes themselves, and their lack of regard for the importance of
the right to own and use private property. This right is a fundamental princi-
ple upon which our country was founded and the primary reason that Ameri-
cans are able to enjoy the standard of living that we do. Erosion of this right
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may, at times, be used for antiquated purposes-as an excuse,
for example, for refusing to accept the concept of ecological ac-
countability as a necessary part of property ownership53-does
not remove the constitutional dimension of the regulatory tak-
ings problem. Rather, this belief makes the problem more com-
plex and more in need of fundamental changes in the value
structure of property law.
erodes cattle producers' ability to provide for their families and remain an
economically viable, productive member of society.
Private Property Rights and Environmental Laws: Hearings Before Senate Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 104th Cong. 107, 112 (June 27, 1995) (statement of Jim
Little, National Spokesman for the National Cattlemen's Association) [hereinafter Little
Statement]. Senator Dole similarly explained the importance of a private property bill
that he sponsored in 1993 by stressing the constitutional foundation of the bill. He noted
that the "Founding Fathers deeply believed in the right of American citizens to hold
private property and that Government should not invade upon that right." 139 CONG.
REC. S5337 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1993) (statement of Sen. Dole). The intent of the bill that
he was sponsoring was to "requir[e] Federal employees to uphold the Constitution." Id.;
see generally LAND RIGHTS (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995) (discussing the 1990s' property
rights rebellion); Nancie Marzulla, The Magic of Property Rights, NATIONAL WILDERNESS
INST. RESOURCE, Spring 1995, reprinted in Defenders of Property Rights, Media Cover-
age, Education & Coalition Building 18 (1995) [hereinafter Defenders of Property Rights]
(discussing the private property movement and the link between private property and
protection of natural resources); Nancie Marzulla, State Private Property Rights Initia-
tives as a Response to Environmental Takings, in ROGER CLEGG ET AL., NATIONAL LEGAL
CENTER FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, REGULATORY TAKINGS: RESTORING PRIVATE PROPERTY
RIGHTS 101-05 (1994) (discussing the private property movement and federal executive
and legislative attempts to protect private property); Carpenter, supra note 39 (discuss-
ing the property rights movement); Lehman, supra note 39 (discussing the successes of
the property rights movement); Defenders of Property Rights, supra (containing informa-
tion about print, radio, and television coverage of the property rights movement).
Two groups working for greater protection of private property are the National
Legal Center for the Public Interest and Defenders of Property Rights. The first group
promotes the protection of individual rights, including private ownership of property. See
CLEGG ET AL., supra, at inside back cover. The second group describes itself as "lead[ing]
the fight" to protect property and as having, as its "sole endeavor[,]" ensuring 'that gov-
ernment respects Fifth Amendment property rights, the foundation of all our constitu-
tional liberties." Defenders of Property Rights, supra, at inside front cover.
53. Professor Sax interprets Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992), as rejecting the "demands of the economy of nature as legitimate obli-
gations of land and of landowners." Sax, supra note 47, at 1446. By "economy of na-
ture," he is referring to an ecological view of land that recognizes the important eco-
logical services being performed by land in an unaltered state. Id. at 1442. Sax in-
terprets Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas as sending the message that "[sitates may
not regulate land use solely by requiring landowners to maintain their property in
its natural state as part of a functioning ecosystem, even though those natural func-
tions may be important to the ecosystem." Id. at 1438 (footnote omitted).
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II. CHOOSING THE APPROPRIATE BRANCH FOR DEFINING
REGULATORY TAKINGS
Assuming that the constitutional dimension of regulatory tak-
ings is accepted, the critical question about the regulatory tak-
ings problem thus becomes: Which branch is best able to provide
the principled decision-making process needed to resolve the
fundamental questions of individual fairness, social obligation,
and popular democracy that underlie the regulatory takings
problem? In this Part of the Article, I argue that the judicial
branch is the only branch that even has a chance of handling
regulatory takings cases in a principled manner.' The word
"chance" is used to recognize that even the judicial branch may
fail to provide principled decision making in the regulatory tak-
ings context, choosing instead to let political values or personal
interests control decision making in the takings area."s Indeed,
at times, the opinions of some Justices of the Supreme Court
seem more consistent with the political ideology of the private
property movement than with the Court's own precedent.56
Because of the nature of the judicial process, however, the
judiciary has the best chance of being objective and rendering
decisions that are not affected by a judge's own political values.
One key aspect of that process is the principle that governs judi-
cial decision making: stare decisis.57 Under this principle, courts
54. If properly structured, a branch with a judicial-type process also might
have a "chance" of providing a principled decision-making process.
55. Cf Neal Devins, The Countermajoritarian Paradox, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1433,
1446 (1995) (book review) (noting that the Supreme Court has been criticized for al-
lowing politics to permeate its abortion jurisprudence).
56. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), for example, has been criticized for its treatment of
Supreme Court precedent and for its inconsistent adherence to the principle of judi-
cial restraint depending on whether economic interests or liberty interests are at
stake. See Byrne, supra note 6, at 117-19; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1046-55
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing Justice Scalia's treatment of the Court's tak-
ings jurisprudence); id. at 1062-64, 1068-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing Jus-
tice Scalia's cavalier dismissal of the doctrine of judicial restraint and his treatment
of precedent); see generally William W. Fisher III, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN.
L. REv. 1393 (1993) (discussing Justice Scalia's inconsistent approach to constitution-
al interpretation and his cavalier use of constitutional principles).
57. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-13,
149-52, 158-69 (1921).
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must follow the rule of law or, when they do not, they at least
must clearly justify significant departures in light of articulated
changes in circumstances, social needs, or information that ne-
cessitates a reevaluation of old rules." In the context of consti-
tutional issues, the Court has developed a rule of absolute neces-
sity to determine when to even address a question of constitu-
tional law.59 Additionally, because of constitutional and pruden-
tial concerns, federal courts generally limit their decisions to the
facts of the case that is before them.60 Finally, as James Madi-
son explained, the courts act as "independent tribunals of jus-
tice"6 and will, because of the constitutional protections for
property and other rights, "consider themselves in a peculiar
manner the guardians of those rights."62 The nature of the judi-
cial process thus serves two important goals: it helps to promote
objective and independent decision making, and it helps to limit
the impact of bad, improper, or unprincipled decisions."
The case for judicial branch resolution of regulatory takings
disputes and the case against legislative or executive branch re-
sponsibility for defining regulatory takings is discussed in the
following three Parts of this Article.
A. The Case for Judicial Branch Resolution of Regulatory
Takings Issues
A number of reasons further explain why the judicial branch
is best able to provide the principled decision-making process
58. See id. For an introduction to the debate over the meaning of "rule of law,"
see William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose: Voluntary Contamination Cleanup Ap-
provals, Incentives, and the Costs of Interminable Liability, 80 MINN. L. REv. 35, 97-
98 (1995).
59. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1062 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila.
Steamship Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885).
60. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (case or controversy requirement); Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-41 (1937); 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3502, 3529 (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1996).
61. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834) (statement of
Rep. Madison), reprinted in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMEs MADISON 197, 207 (Charles F.
Hobson et al. eds., 1979).
62. Id.
63. See generally CARDOZO, supra note 57, passim (discussing the methods of
history, tradition, and sociology underlying judicial decision making and the
judiciary's adherence to precedent).
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needed to resolve the fundamental questions of individual fair-
ness, social obligation, and political theory raised by the regula-
tory takings problem. First, decisions that are made by parties
about the constitutionality of land-use regulations reflect behav-
ioral choices that make judicial development of regulatory tak-
ings law desirable-at least until the behavioral choices are bet-
ter understood-and that need the type of incremental deci-
sion making the courts conduct. Second, the Takings Clause
serves an important protective function for individuals, provid-
ing a type of protection to individual property owners that re-
quires judicial involvement not only to set minimum levels of
constitutional protection against regulatory conduct, but also to
resolve constitutional questions about regulatory takings
standards. Third, the Takings Clause serves a fundamental po-
litical theory function, helping to define the constitutional bal-
ance between public and private interests-in particular, be-
tween the interests of private property owners and popular de-
mocracy. This balance is best and most appropriately defined
through the type of ad hoc fine-tuning that the courts provide.
Although selecting the judiciary as the most appropriate tak-
ings decisionmaker is not intended to suggest approval or disap-
proval of any particular court-created takings principle or, more
generally, of the Court's takings jurisprudence, the selection
does reflect a different view of decision making under the uncer-
tainty of takings law than that identified under conventional de-
cision-making theory.65 That is, decision making conducted un-
der the uncertainty of takings law-more specifically, the uncer-
tainty of whether any particular regulation affecting property is
valid without compensation-involves different and more com-
plex behavioral choices than the choices identified under conven-
tional economic thinking. These more complex behavioral choices
not only make judicial control of regulatory takings law desir-
able; they also necessitate the type of marginal analysis and
evaluation of individual interests and expectations that the
64. For further discussion, see infra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
65. See generally JOHN VON NEUmANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1953) (discussing conventional decision-mak-
ing theory).
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courts traditionally conduct."
One widely used conventional model of decision making, ex-
pected utility theory, defines the thought process used by a deci-
sionmaker according to some basic assumptions about human
behavior.17 One key assumption of this model is that people
evaluate options and outcomes in terms of their impact on wel-
fare, which is defined in terms of economic variables such as
wealth, income, and consumption.' Because these economic
variables typically include an assumption of diminishing re-
turns, the decisionmaker is, at least implicitly, assumed to be
risk averse, or hesitant to take risks, once a certain level of
welfare is reached.69 A second key assumption is that the deci-
sionmaker is a rational actor and therefore evaluates options
based on rational expectations." This assumption of a rational
actor who uses rational expectations to evaluate options basical-
ly means that events that have been anticipated or that are
irrelevant to the consequences of the decision or action will not
alter the decisionmaker's choice. 7' That is, the decisionmaker
will make choices so as to maximize his or her net expected
utility.72
66. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 33-38 (1984) (discussing the "Court's attention to marginal analysis").
67. See generally WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 75-96, 103-21
(4th ed. 1989) (discussing the notion of utility, assumptions of rationality, and the
theory of utility maximization); Mark J. Machina, Choice Under Uncertainty: Prob-
lems Solved and Unsolved, in VALUING HEALTH RISKS, COSTS, AND BENEFITS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING 134 (P. Brett Hammond & Rob Coppock eds.,
1990) (discussing conventional expected utility theory and challenges to that theory);
George A. Quattrone & Amos Tversky, Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analy-
ses of Political Choice, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 719 (1988) (contrasting the expected
utility model of rational choice theory with the prospect theory model of psychologi-
cal analysis).
68. See Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psy-
chology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 750 (1990).
69. See Machina, supra note 67, at 136-39; Noll & Krier, supra note 68, at
750; Quattrone & Tversky, supra note 67, at 720-21. For further discussion of risk
preferences, see infra note 75.
70. See EDvIN MANSFIELD, ECONOMICS 423-24 (7th ed. 1992).
71. See NICHOLSON, supra note 67, at 78; Noll & Krier, supra note 68, at 750-51.
72. See Quattrone & Tversky, supra note 67, at 719; Robert E. Scott, Error and
Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on the Relationship Between Cogni-
tive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 330 n.5 (1986).
Implicit in this rational actor assumption are the following postulates: (1) An individual
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Some commentators, applying conventional economic theory to
landowners deciding whether to pursue a land use regulated by
government, conclude that the uncertainty of regulatory takings
law, particularly the possibility that the regulatory conduct will
not be a compensable taking, will cause the decisionmaker to be
less willing to invest in wealth-creating enterprises. 7 Under
conventional decision-making theory, this result would occur if
the decisionmaker were risk averse and lowered the expected
value74 from the land-use option to reflect the decisionmaker's
risk aversion.75 This adjustment, in turn, could cause the deci-
always prefers more to less, (2) An individual is not tempted to select alternatives that do
not maximize individual welfare, (3) An individual's preferences are consistent; they vary
neither over time nor according to the manner in which the alternatives are described,
and (4) An individual's preferences are transitive; if the individual prefers A to B and B to
C, then the individual prefers A to C. See NICHOLSON, supra note 67, at 76-77; Machina,
supra note 67, at 136, 140-44; Scott, supra, at 330 n.5.
Other models of rational choice theory include Bayesian theory (dealing with how
individuals react to subsequent evidence and basically providing that individuals will
predictably revise their opinions about probabilities in light of new information), see David
A. Lombardero, Do Special Verdicts Improve the Structure of Jury Decision-making?, 36
JURIMETRICS 275 (1996), and the riskless theory of choice among commodity bundles (deal-
ing with how individuals allocate income among a number of commodity bundles subject
to a budget constraint and providing that a person will choose a bundle of commodities
such that "the marginal utility of the last dollar spent on all commodities purchased is the
same"). See MANSFIELD, supra note 70, at 423-24; see also Noll & Krier, supra note 68, at
750; Quattrone & Tversky, supra note 67, at 719-20; Scott, supra, at 330 n.5.
73. For explanations and analyses of this argument, see Byrne, supra note 6,
at 124-25; William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman,
Comments on Economic Interpretations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 269, 269-77 (1988); see generally Farber, supra note 9 (discussing and evaluat-
ing various economic models of takings).
74. The expected value concept is one of the early probability theories used to
explain decision making. Reflecting an ex ante perspective, the concept measures the
value of a possible outcome or prospect in terms of its probability, or likelihood of
occurrence, and the magnitude of its effect. See NICHOLSON, supra note 67, at 238-
39. If a choice involves a range of outcomes or set of events, the expected value of
that choice would be the sum of the expected payoffs of each outcome or event. See
id. The expected value of a prospect thus does not represent an actual outcome, but
rather a weighted average of all possible payoffs, where the weight used with each
payoff is its associated probability. See id. at 239. In choosing among payoffs, a ra-
tional actor would choose the payoff with the greatest expected value. See CHARLES
J. GOETZ, LAW AND ECONOMICS 76-77 (1984); Machina, supra note 67, at 135.
75. In the early 1700s, probability theorists began to demonstrate that a deci-
sionmaker did not consider expected value alone in making choices under uncertain-
ty. See NICHOLSON, supra note 67, at 240. In particular, expected value theory ig-
nored the decisionmaker's reaction to the degree of risk posed by each outcome. See
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sionmaker to choose another option over the land-use option
even though the two options had the same expected value, with
one option involving a higher degree of risk than the other, or
even though the land-use option had a higher expected value
than the chosen option if no reaction to risk were considered.76
The behavioral choices of landowners deciding whether to pur-
sue a regulated land use, however, do not appear to reflect the
disincentive to invest that is predicted to result from the uncer-
tainty of regulatory takings law under conventional decision-
making theory. Although some landowners may be unwilling to
invest because of concern over the possibility of an uncompen-
sated taking,77 the fact is that the amount of undeveloped land
held by private parties continues to decline.78 Further, because
most privately owned land is subject to some sort of environmen-
tal or land-use regulation restricting development,"8 landowners
id. at 241. A risk-averse decisionmaker would react negatively to risk and discount a
prospect's expected value because of the degree of risk. A risk-prone or risk-seeking
decisionmaker would react positively to risk and adjust the expected value of an out-
come up to reflect higher levels of risk. Finally, a risk-neutral decisionmaker would
not care about the degree of risk posed by a prospect and therefore would not need
to adjust the expected value of the prospect. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN,
LAW AND ECONOMICS 57-62 (1988); GOETZ, supra note 74, at 79-82; see also Machina,
supra note 67, at 135-36 (explaining the development of modern probability theories).
76. See KENNETH R. MACCRIMMON & DONALD A. WEHRUNG, TAKING RISKS 12-
13 (1986).
77. For discussions of when this situation might arise, see Byrne, supra note 6,
at 124 & n.221; Farber, supra note 9, at 281-82.
78. From 1982 to 1992, the amount of developed, nonfederal land increased by
about 26%. See 1995 CENSUS, supra note 39, at 228; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT
OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1990, at 198 (110th ed.
1990); see also STATISTICAL RECORD OF THE ENVIRONMENT 198-202 (Charity Anne Dorgan
ed., 3d ed. 1995) (providing additional statistics on land cover and use).
79. "In nearly every urban area of the United States, and in a growing number of
rural communities, a landowner must... comply with... building codes, zoning regula-
tions, and subdivision controls" before improving his or her land. 1 KENNETH H. YOUNG,
ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1.02, at 4 (4th ed. 1995). As early as 1930, 35
states had adopted the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act. See id. § 2.21, at 68. Even-
tually, every state adopted some type of zoning-enabling legislation. See id. Further, as
one commentator observed, "[flederal regulatory acts governing air, water, land, and
animals have brought in components of the federal government as active forces in shift-
ing agendas towards greater environmental regulation at the federal, state, and local
levels." JOHN G. FRANCIS, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 165 (1993). In many parts of the
United States, local and state governments have developed "environmentally informed
land-use regulatory regimes." Id.
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appear to be choosing development options even when those op-
tions require government approval or modification to meet gov-
ernment requirements. 80
Additionally, a significant portion of privately owned land located in coastal areas is
subject to wetlands and other environmental regulations. See WILLIAM L. WANT, LAW OF
WETLANDS REGULATION § 13.01 (1996) (discussing state wetland laws and other regula-
tions enacted pursuant to the Coastal Zone Management Act). Currently, wetlands con-
stitute five percent of the contiguous United States. See 2 U.S. SECRETARY OF THE INTE-
RIOR, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS ON WETLANDS 33 (1994). For more information
on the treatment of wetlands in the United States, see WANT, supra, § 2.01[31 (discussing
the ecological nature of coastal lands); id. §§ 2.02-3.04 (discussing federal and state
wetlands regulations).
80. Privately owned land that is subject to zoning or other public land-use controls
may be subject to government approval of development plans if the plans violate lot size,
frontage, and yard restrictions. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE IAW §§ 6.41-.42
(3d ed. 1993). Approval also may be required for "conditional" uses, such as gas stations
in commercial districts or apartments in single-family residential districts. See id. § 6.53.
Privately owned land that qualifies as wetlands often requires federal, state, and local
government approval of development plans. See WANT, supra note 79, §§ 4.06[2]-[3], [5].
The federal government, for example, requires a permit to modify or destroy wetlands
when such modification involves the discharge of dredged or fill materials, see id. §§
4.06[21-[3], or when the modification utilizes pilings that are closely spaced, replace the
bottom of a waterway, reduce water circulation, or adversely affect aquatic functions. See
id. § 4.06[5]. For a more complete discussion of activities that are subject to wetlands
jurisdiction, see id. § 4.06; LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF LAND USE
§§ 4.03[31[a]-[fl (1995) (discussing the regulation of wetlands by the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency and the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE)).
The ACE is responsible for granting permits under section 10 of the Rivers and Har-
bors Appropriation Act of 1899 for any work in or over navigable waters of the United
States or any work that affects the course, condition, capacity, or location of those waters.
See 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994). The ACE also grants permits under section 404 of the Clean
Water Act for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the waters of the United
States. See id. § 1344(a). During the fiscal year (FY) 1995, the ACE received 13,856 appli-
cations for individual permits. In addition, 6395 applications were carried over from the
previous year and 6009 applications were withdrawn. See Army Corps of Engineers, U.S.
Dep't of Defense, Quarterly Performance Data Report for the Regulatory Program: Fiscal
Year 1995 (unpublished document, on file with author) [hereinafter ACE 1995 Report];
Telephone Interview with Frank Torbett, Program Analyst, United States Army Corps of
Engineers (June 24, 1996) [hereinafter Torbett Interview]. Of the 14,242 remaining appli-
cations, 5556 were issued by the "standard" process (which involves public notice), 3210
were issued through letters of permission (which bypass the public notice process), 75
were denied with prejudice (which means that the permits were denied based on the
evaluation of the ACE), 272 were denied without prejudice (which means that the ACE
denied the permits because the applicants' state government or other governing unit re-
fused to allow the permit to be issued), and 5129 were not processed during FY 1995 and
were carried over to FY 1996. See ACE 1995 Report, supra; Torbett Interview, supra. In
addition to the individual permits, the ACE also granted 30,260 regional permits and
39,677 nationwide permits. See ACE 1995 Report, supra; see generally WANT, supra note
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The psychological effect of the Takings Clause may explain
why landowners who consider development options are not as
discouraged by the uncertainty of takings law as predicted.81 By
the psychological effect of the Takings Clause, I mean the effect
that the presence of the clause in the Constitution has on deci-
sionmakers, whether they are regulators, legislators, or private
parties. As a result of the clause's existence, many decisionmak-
ers apparently believe that property owners have a constitution-
ally protected right to develop their property and to make a prof-
it, sometimes even when only a small portion of the owner's
original property remains and the owner has already made a
significant profit from the part that has been sold.82 Though
property owners may accept limitations existing at the time of
initial investment, they strenuously resist changes in govern-
ment restrictions that are made subsequent to that time and
that adversely affect this perceived right to develop and to profit
from their land.'
79, § 5.03 (discussing regional and nationwide permits).
81. For other explanations of why uncompensated takings do not discourage in-
vestment by property owners as predicted, see Byrne, supra note 6, at 124-25;
Farber, supra note 9, at 280-82.
82. Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council appears to
reflect this belief. See 505 U.S. 1003, 1017-19 (1992) (equating land with profit and
productive or economically beneficial use and explaining how reciprocity of advantage
would not exist if productive use was not permitted); see also Lynda L. Butler, Private
Land Use, Changing Public Values, and Notions of Relativity, 1992 BYU L. REV. 629,
634-36 (discussing the development perspective taken by Justice Scalia in Lucas). For a
discussion of the nature and source of these private land use expectations, see id. at 632-
40. See generally Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 515-20
(1987) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that only the regulated property interest
should be considered in determining the economic impact of a state law); Loveladies Har-
bor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (focusing only on the regulated
portion, about 12 acres of wetlands, and not on the original parcel of 250 acres, in deter-
mining whether a taking existed); Changes in Requirements for National Register of
Historic Places: Hearing on Historic Preservation before the Subcomm. on National Parks,
Forests and Lands of the House Comm. on Resources (Mar. 20, 1996), available in 1996
WL 7137193 (testimony of Nancie G. Marzulla, President and Chief Legal Counsel, De-
fenders of Property Rights) (arguing that the maintenance of a free society requires the
respect of an individual's right to possess, enjoy, and use his or her property); 141 CONG.
REC. H2587 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cooley) (referring to millions of
acres of valuable timber that lie unharvested because of spotted owl regulations); John
A. Humbach, Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV. 339, 351-65 (1989) (dis-
cussing the notion of a constitutional right to profit and the market ratchet effect).
83. The lengthy and costly judicial suits that landowners are willing to pursue to
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In the context of land-use decision making, the psychological
effect of the Takings Clause appears to have helped landowners
overcome whatever disincentive to invest that the uncertainty of
regulatory takings law might have produced. Although the exact
psychological effect of the clause cannot be determined without
further study,' one plausible consequence is that the clause's
psychological effect leads to the formation of a heuristic, or rule
of thumb, which helps in deciding whether a government regula-
tion constitutes a compensable taking either generally or in a
particular situation.' Although heuristics can be useful in eval-
protect their land-use expectations provide evidence of this resistance. The dispute in
Preseault v. United States, 66 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir.) (full opinion available at Nos. 93-
5067, 93-5068, 1995 WL 544703 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 14, 1995)), withdrawn and vacated, 66
F.3d 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev'd en bane, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996), demonstrates
how lengthy this process can be. That dispute began shortly after the state of Vermont
leased a railroad right-of-way to the City of Burlington for use as a pedestrian and bike
trail in 1985. See Preseault, 1995 WL 544703, at *4. The prior lessee, a railroad, stopped
operation in 1970 and tore up the track in 1975. See id. After the landowners petitioned
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) for a certificate of abandonment, the ICC
retroactively approved a request by the state to discontinue, as opposed to abandon, rail
service and permit use as a trail under the National Trails Act Amendments. See id.
Now on its second trip through the courts, see id. at *5, the litigation has taken a tortu-
ous path. In September 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
concluded that federal transportation law needed to be considered in defining the
landowners' interest in the railroad right-of-way over their property. See id. at *13. Be-
cause federal transportation law allowed the ICC to authorize discontinuance and to en-
courage other public purposes, the court concluded that any interests that the landown-
ers had in the right-of-way had not ripened into possessory rights and that therefore no
taking had occurred. See id. at *19. A few months later, the court's opinion was with-
drawn and its judgment was vacated because a rehearing en bane was granted. See
Preseault, 66 F.3d at 1190. In November 1996, after the rehearing en bane, the Federal
Circuit reversed the three-judge panel ruling and held that the railroad right-of-way was
never more than an easement, that the easement for railroad operations did not include
use for public recreational trails, and that conversion of the abandoned easement to oth-
er uses constituted a taking of the landowners' property. See Presault, 100 F.3d at 1530,
1537, 1542, 1550-51.
84. Further study is needed because of the diversity of psychological theories
on decision making and the absence of empirical data on the relationship between
the Takings Clause and individual decisions. For additional discussion of cognitive
decision-making theories, see infra note 85.
85. Heuristics are judgmental rules that "reduce the complex tasks of assessing
probabilities and predicting values [of uncertain events] to simpler judgmental opera-
tions." Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAIN=: HEURISTIcs AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman
et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter HEURISTICS AND BIASES].
Unlike economic decision-making theory, which has been dominated for decades by
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uating options and outcomes, they also can lead to "severe and
systematic errors." " Heuristics based on the "takings psyche,"
or the psychology of the Takings Clause, could produce overesti-
mation of the strength and scope of property rights, underesti-
the theory of expected utility, the field of cognitive decision-making research is filled with
a variety of approaches and hypotheses. See Scott, supra note 72, at 332-33. The subject
of human cognition and decision making encompasses at least three distinct fields of so-
cial science research: the acquisition of information, the formation of preferences, and the
implementation of those preferences in the choice process over time. See id.
Because of the variety of cognitive decision-making theories and the fields developing
in the cognitive research area, the possible effects of the takings psyche appear to be
numerous. For instance, competing interest groups' "framing" of the legal, moral, and
economic issues associated with takings can have a tremendous effect on how landowners
receive and process information. See Noll & Krier, supra note 68, at 769 (discussing how
the characterization of an issue will dramatically affect the preferences of voters).
Additionally, both the anchoring phenomenon, see Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus
Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra, at 463, 481-82,
and the availability heuristic, see id. at 465-72, could cause a landowner to either ignore
or misjudge the influence of relevant information, leading to inaccurate estimates of the
probability of a taking. See Slovic et al., supra, at 465-72, 481-82 (discussing the avail-
ability heuristic and the anchoring effect); infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing heuristics and anchoring).
In the context of takings issues, a number of theories of choice and decision-making
strategy suggest a variety of individual responses to the existence of the Takings Clause.
A landowner, for example, may view the clause, particularly its compensation require-
ment, as a factor that mitigates some of the risk of a taking, thus failing to account for all
relevant costs. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 509, 531 (1986) (discussing this aspect of a compensation requirement and how a
failure to consider all costs results in an inefficient level of investment). Alternatively,
under the theory of self-command or pre-commitment, a landowner may limit or modify
future behavior to ensure commitment to a present decision to ignore the possibility of a
taking made because of the existence of the clause. See Scott, supra note 72, at 342-47
(discussing internal rules and pre-commitment strategies). Or a landowner may assume
that the Takings Clause embodies a societal concern for fairness, and decide to develop
his or her land with the belief that a subsequent government appropriation or regulation
implicating that concern for fairness will result in equitable relief in the form of compen-
sation. See Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, 19 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 487, 497-501 (1994) (reviewing RICHARD H. THALEh, QUASI RATIONAL Eco-
NOMICS (1991) and RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOM-
ALIES OF ECONOMIC LrFE (1992)) (discussing a number of psychological experiments that
indicate the presence of fairness concerns in individual decisions). Finally, a landowner
may make different development decisions depending on whether he or she views the
Takings Clause as a legal mechanism that provides a gain or one that minimizes a loss.
See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMEImCA 263, 279 (1979) (proposing that individuals are risk-averse in
protecting perceived gains and risk-seeking in avoiding perceived losses).
86. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 85, at 3.
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mation of the probability of no regulatory taking being found,
and false optimism about the right to pursue development
plans.
87
Judicial resolution of regulatory takings is needed to deal with
the biases and errors in land-use decision making that might
result from application of heuristic principles based on the tak-
ings psyche. These heuristic principles would vary according to
the decisionmaker's perception of takings risk,88 to the particu-
lar situation that the decisionmaker faced, 9 and to the type of
87. Because the planning of land development projects often involves compound
events, biases in the evaluation of the events can be significant. See id. at 16. If, for
example, the project has a conjunctive character, its success depends on the occur-
rence of each of a series of events. See iU. Though the probability of each event may
be high, the overall probability of success will be lower, sometimes significantly so, if
a large number of events must occur. See id. at 15-16. Empirical studies have shown
that people tend to overestimate the probability of conjunctive events. See id. at 15.
This general tendency, in turn, leads to "unwarranted optimism in the evaluation of
the likelihood" that the project will succeed. See id. at 16.
88. Psychological studies indicate that people can have dramatically different
perceptions of risk. See Slovic et al., supra note 85, at 465-72. An individual's per-
ception may be affected by the intensity of media coverage of an event or by the
frequency with which the event occurs. See id. at 465, 467-68. An individual may
overestimate the likelihood of an event's occurrence if that event easily is called to
mind. See id. at 465. Conversely, if information regarding an event is unavailable or
if an individual has little experience with an event, he or she may underestimate
the likelihood of that event. See id at 465-72.
Studies also indicate that individuals tend to make probability estimates based
on initially presented values. See id at 481. Thus, an individual's perception of tak-
ings risk is likely to be "anchored" to his or her initial values or original informa-
tion base. See id. at 481-82; infra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing the
phenomenon of anchoring). In an area as confusing as takings law, this anchoring
effect could conceivably have an even more dramatic impact on the estimation of
probability, perhaps causing the decisionmaker to ignore the confusing new informa-
tion or to magnify the error committed in assessing the probability of a taking by
misinterpreting the new information.
89. Studies have shown, for example, that decisionmakers react differently to
situations depending on whether the situations have a conjunctive or disjunctive
character. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 85, at 15-16. In a conjunctive situa-
tion, the success of a project or plan depends on the occurrence of each of a series
of events. See i&L at 16. In a disjunctive situation, events are statistically indepen-
dent of each other. See id. Individuals tend to overestimate the probability of con-
junctive events and underestimate the probability of disjunctive events. See id. at 15.
The overestimation of the likelihood of conjunctive events leads to unjustified opti-
mism about the success of a project. See id. at 16. In the context of risk evaluation
of complicated systems, the underestimation of the probabilities of disjunctive events
leads to the underestimation of the likelihood of failure. See id. at 15-16.
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heuristic involved.9" The heuristic could, for example, involve a
landowner's belief that constitutionally protected property in-
cludes the right to make a profit9' and that government action
that prevents a return on any recognized property interest or
that causes a diminution in value constitutes a taking.92 It
could also involve a landowner's belief that constitutionally pro-
tected property includes the right to use property and that any
significant restriction or prohibition of a lawful use constitutes a
taking.9" Some of the takings psyche heuristics could be due to
the phenomenon of anchoring, which refers to an individual's
tendency to allow initial values to bias subsequent probability
estimates.' Other takings judgments might reflect the avail-
ability heuristic, which involves assessing an event or outcome
in light of recent or easily recalled instances of similar events or
outcomes.9" A more generalized decision-making process, like
90. See generally id. at 4-20 (describing the representativeness, availability, and
anchoring heuristics).
91. For a discussion of this perceived right and a response, see Humbach,
supra note 82, at 354-60.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 360-69 (discussing permissible limitations on land use and invest-
ment-backed expectations).
94. Studies indicate that probability estimates are "anchored" to initial values,
which result from either partial probability computations or the initial "framing" of
the situation. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 85, at 14-15. The anchoring
effect can lead to a significant misestimation of probabilities. See id. at 14-18. For
instance, in many disjunctive systems, even when the perceived likelihood of the fail-
ure of any one essential component is small, the probability of overall failure can be
quite substantial if the system contains many essential components. Because of the
anchoring phenomenon, though, an individual may perceive the probability of failure
of the entire system to be low. See id. at 15-16; see also supra notes 87 and 89 (dis-
cussing the perception of risk in disjunctive and conjunctive systems).
95. See Slovic et al., supra note 85, at 465-72; Tversky & Kahneman, supra
note 85, at 11-14. In some situations, people have a tendency to evaluate the proba-
bility of an event by the ease with which examples of that event can be recalled.
See Slovic et al., supra note 85, at 465. This tendency may lead individuals to over-
estimate the likelihood of events that are in the news or the probability of events
that are easily imaginable. See id. at 465, 467-68; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note
85, at 11-14; see also supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing the ef-
fects of heuristics). In the takings context, then, an individual may overestimate the
probability that a regulation will be considered a taking if recent decisions have so
classified similar regulations or if public sentiment reflects a strong belief that many
current environmental regulations amount to takings. This optimism may be unwar-
ranted given the fact-specific nature of takings decisions.
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the legislative process or administrative rulemaking, would not
be as effective in dealing with these takings heuristics because it
could not correct errors occurring in particular decision-making
situations or on an individual basis. Further, the legislative pro-
cess might even magnify the errors that the heuristics produced,
especially if the group of land-use decisionmakers employing the
heuristic has the power to influence legislators. Although the
administrative process might be better able to make corrections
than the legislative process, the administrative branch also
would be subject to political influence.96
In addition to the corrective function that courts would serve
in evaluating land-use decision making under the Takings
Clause, judicial resolution of regulatory takings issues is needed
to promote an important protective function. Because the Tak-
ings Clause protects individual rights and not majoritarian ex-
pressions of will, courts are the only branch that can appropri-
ately be the final arbiter of regulatory takings disputes. To sug-
gest that courts eliminate the troubled regulatory takings doc-
trine and allow the legislative branch to deal with the problem
of regulated property rights discounts the protective function
and individual rights focus of the Takings Clause. 7 The mini-
96. See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1065-69 (1990) (discussing the potential influence of interest
groups on administrative agencies). Although the judiciary admittedly also is subject
to heuristics, its incremental decision-making process tends to minimize error. Addi-
tionally, the judicial decision-making process generally is not a political process, but
rather is governed by other principles that help to ensure more neutral decision
making. See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
97. Professor Treanor's response to this point about discounting probably would
be that the protective function would not be discounted even if the legislature played
a larger role because the courts still would provide constitutional protection of prop-
erty when such protection is needed to avoid political process unfairness. See
Treanor, supra note 9, at 863-66. Unlike Professor Byrne, then, Professor Treanor
sees some constitutional role for judicial resolution of regulatory takings though that
role would be different from, if not more limited than, the current one. Compare id.
at 855-56 (noting the role of courts to "protect those whose property interests
are . . . particularly unlikely to receive fair consideration from majoritarian decision-
makers"), with Byrne, supra note 6, at 93-96, 115-17, 128-37 (arguing that "changes
in the scope of property interests" should not raise constitutional questibns). One dif-
ficulty with Treanor's position is that it ignores the role that the Takings Clause
and current takings jurisprudence may have played in ensuring political process fair-
ness for property owners. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
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mum level of protection provided by the clause should not be de-
fined through the democratic process. Though that process now
appears to protect property owners," the political process fair-
ness accorded to property owners could change in the future,
especially if the regulatory takings doctrine is, as some have
advocated, removed as a constraint on federal and state govern-
ments99 or if campaign spending rules are changed to alter the
incentives placed on legislators.' In addition, political process
unfairness may not pose a problem for property owners precisely
because of the protection given to property by the Takings
Clause and other parts of the Constitution; 0 ' part of that pro-
tection includes the regulatory takings doctrine.
Furthermore, although legislators could decide to improve ju-
dicial regulatory takings standards or to increase the level of
takings protection accorded property owners beyond the consti-
tutional minimum, these initiatives still would not eliminate the
need for judicial resolution of regulatory takings issues.0 2 Any
increased or improved protection enacted by a legislature must
be tied in some way to judicial takings standards developed
around the individual rights focus of the clause.' To the ex-
tent that a legislative initiative increased the protection set by
judicial takings standards, the initiative would be making fun-
damental public policy choices-not constitutional choices-that
should be evaluated under normal tools of policy analysis. To the
extent that the legislative initiative improved judicial takings
standards-in all likelihood by providing clearer but, by necessi-
ty, more generalized standards-the initiative would risk inher-
ent inconsistency with the individual rights focus of judicial
standards and the Takings Clause. Such an initiative also would
run the risk of being too inflexible to allow government to func-
98. Some scholars use this current protection as a reason for limiting the
judiciary's role in resolving regulatory takings issues and relying instead on the leg-
islative process. See Byrne, supra note 6, at 115-17, 128-31; Treanor, supra note 9,
at 784, 864-72; supra notes 9, 38-50 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the way the drafters
incorporated property into the American political structure and the Constitution).
102. For further discussion, see supra Part I.
103. See supra Part I.
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tion effectively, as well as the risk of providing a significant sub-
sidy for property owners. Further, all of these risks could occur
even though the initiative would not necessarily avoid the costs
of constitutional litigation.'
The Takings Clause should not be treated in isolation or as a
subterfuge for the promotion of political values without consider-
ation of the delicate balance between private and public inter-
ests now reflected in the Constitution. Some of the proposed leg-
islative initiatives have lost sight of the complex balance of
rights, interests, and powers set forth in the Constitution. Re-
cently proposed congressional takings bills, for example, would,
by legislative fiat, place property rights on a pedestal supported
neither by the drafters of the Constitution nor by 200 years of
Supreme Court interpretation.' The courts traditionally have
104. Senate Bill 605, better known as the Omnibus Private Property Rights Bill,
provides examples of all three risks. S. 605, 104th Cong. (1995). For example, by auto-
matically awarding compensation to property owners who suffer at least a 33%
diminution in value because of certain government action, regardless of the justification
for the government action or the property owner's expectations, see id. § 204(a)(2)(D), the
bill provides a bright line rule at the expense of individual fairness and justice and at
the expense of the public interest. Individual property owners who suffer a diminution in
value greater than or equal to 33% due to covered government action would automatical-
ly receive compensation, while those who suffer a 32.5% diminution or who suffer more
than a 33% diminution because of government action exempted by the bill would not
receive compensation. See id. Furthermore, because the diminution in value is linked to
the property interest being regulated, instead of to the property as a whole, see id. §
204(a)(2)(B), the amount of compensation owed to property owners because of the dimi-
nution-in-value provision could be significant. See Private Property Rights and Environ-
mental Laws: Hearings Before Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works,
104th Cong. 181 (July 12, 1995) (statement of Alice M. Rivlin, Director, Office of Man-
agement and Budget) [hereinafter Rivlin Statement]; id. at 187, 190-92 (July 12, 1995)
(statement of Michael L. Davis, Assistant for Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers) [hereinafter Davis Statement]; id. at 65, 66-70 (June 27, 1995) (statement of
John R. Schmidt, Associate Attorney General, Department of Justice) [hereinafter
Schmidt Statement]; Byrne, supra note 6, at 130, 136-39. Finally, the bill places restric-
tions on the funding of compensation awards that some predict would cripple the federal
government. See S. 605, supra, § 204(a)(2)(B)-(D); Davis Statement, supra, at 189-92;
Rivlin Statement, supra, at 182-83; Schmidt Statement, supra, at 66, 68-70.
105. Senate Bill 605, for example, has been criticized for its inconsistencies with
takings jurisprudence. See Private Property Rights and Environmental Laws: Hear-
ings Before Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 104th Cong. 215
(July 12, 1995) (statement of Richard J. Lazarus, Professor of Law, Washington Uni-
versity School of Law in St. Louis) [hereinafter Lazarus Statement]; id. at 94 (June
27, 1995) (statement of Frank I. Michelman, Robert Walmsley University Professor,
Harvard Law School) [hereinafter Michelman Statement]; id. at 76 (June 27, 1995)
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considered that balance through their ad hoc approach to tak-
ings. Although the ad hoc approach may not result in clear or
comprehensive solutions, it does allow for the fine-tuning of ben-
efits and burdens necessitated by the constitutional balance.
B. The Case Against Legislative Branch Resolution of
Regulatory Takings Issues
Relying on the legislative branch to handle the regulatory tak-
ings problem would not be effective for a number of other rea-
sons. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the courts have
failed to develop legally, philosophically, historically, or economi-
cally sound regulatory takings standards, there is no compelling
reason to believe that the legislative branch would succeed when
the courts have failed. At least some of the scholars and
policymakers who favor legislative resolution of regulatory tak-
ings issues appear to assume that the legislature will engage in
rational decision making. Proposed legislative takings initia-
tives, however, suggest that fiscally, legally, or scientifically
sound policy choices will not necessarily result."6 As several
commentators have explained, those initiatives would remove
incentives for landowners to take into account the public good
and, in fact, would reward speculative land investment at public
expense.' 7 The proposed congressional bills also would encour-
age landowners to pursue the most environmentally destructive
land uses and would have significant fiscal implications.0 8
(statement of Joseph L. Sax, Counselor to the Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary for Policy, U.S. Department of the Interior) [hereinafter Sax Statement];
Schmidt Statement, supra note 104, at 66-68.
106. For criticism of federal takings bills, see Davis Statement, supra note 104;
Lazarus Statement, supra note 105; Michelnan Statement, supra note 105; Rivlin
Statement, supra note 104; Sax Statement, supra note 105.
107. See Davis Statement, supra note 104, at 191; Lazarus Statement, supra
note 105, at 220; Sax Statement, supra note 105, at 77-78. But see Private Property
Rights and Environmental Laws: Hearings Before Senate Committee on Environment
and Public Works, 104th Cong. 221, 227-28 (July 12, 1995) (statement of Jonathan
Adler, Director of Environmental Studies for the Competitive Enterprise Institute)
[hereinafter Adler Statement] (arguing that the incentives created by regulatory tak-
ings result in greater environmental destruction).
108. See Davis Statement, supra note 104, at 190-93; Lazarus Statement, supra
note 105, at 220.
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Even a legislative solution like the one outlined by Professor
Byrne would encourage land development and use at the ex-
pense of natural systems."9 Moreover, the legislative initia-
tives generally deemphasize science either by recognizing a
taking after a legal threshold involving diminution in value is
passed or by vesting a property right in a landowner once the
landowner passes a certain point in the development approval
process."0 If the legislature cannot develop a more effective
solution, then society probably would be better off with the ad
hoc, incremental, and error-minimizing approach of the judiciary
than with the broad-based, generalized, and error-magnifying
solutions typical of the legislative branch."'
These concerns over legislative takings initiatives are not in-
tended to suggest that legislative intervention in the environ-
mental regulatory process is improper or illegitimate. To the
contrary, legislative intervention into the environmental regula-
tory process after the details of regulation have been developed
by agencies is probably the only practical way for the legislature
to provide democratic legitimacy in the environmental area. En-
vironmental regulation requires too much technical data and too
many detailed decisions for the legislature to make all of the
necessary policy choices up front at the time of enactment.1
2
The overly rigid takings bills recently introduced in Congress,
however, will interfere with the very necessary step of develop-
ing detailed environmental standards through the use of the
technical expertise of agencies. A reactive instead of proactive
democratic process of regulation may be the best way to legiti-
mize the development of rules in an area as complex as environ-
mental law."'
109. See generally Byrne, supra note 6 (arguing for the abolition of the regulato-
ry takings doctrine).
110. See Carpenter, supra note 39, at 68.
111. For further discussion of incremental decision making and disjointed prob-
lem solving, see CHARLES EDWARD LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY:
DECISION MAKING THROUGH MUTUAL ADJUSTMENT 179 (1965); WILLIAM OPHULS,
ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY 191-93 (1977).
112. For a more complex suggestion for promoting democratic legitimacy and
competence in environmental policy-making by linking decision-making methods with
substantive tasks, see SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CONTROLLING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
78-80, 120-40 (1995).
113. Edward Keynes, in his 1996 book Liberty, Property, and Privacy, argued
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Furthermore, because of the incentives of the electoral process
and the psychological effect that the Takings Clause has on
property owners who either serve in the legislative branch or
lobby legislative officials, legislators are likely to skew their de-
cision making in favor of at least certain types of property own-
ers. This skewing could occur because legislators overvalue the
constitutional strength of property rights, discount the public
interest justifying uncompensated regulation, or respond to the
economic and political pressures of certain property owners. A
number of scholars have written about the incentives of the elec-
toral process and about the political influence of property own-
ers."4 Under a public choice theory of government, legislators
are more likely to respond to "small groups with high stakes
[that] have a disproportionately great influence on the political
process.""5 Empirical and theoretical evidence offered by these
scholars supports classifying property owners as such a
group. 6 Additionally, the demoralizing psychological effect of
takings on victims," 7 and, perhaps more implicitly, the psycho-
logical effect of the Takings Clause in general, could skew the
decision-making process of property owners and lawmakers in
favor of property rights. The psychological effect of the Takings
Clause, for example, could cause property owners, particularly
those who have been "victims" of past uncompensated takings or
who knew such victims, to resist land-use regulation more stren-
uously in the future.' It could also cause property owners in
that the joint sharing of authority to define constitutional rights between judicial
and legislative branches "promotes a dialogue that inhibits both judicial overreaching
and the abandonment of individuals' rights to intemperate legislative majorities." ED-
WARD KEYNES, LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND PRIVACY, at x (1996).
114. See Byrne, supra note 6, at 129-30; Farber, supra note 9, at 288-94; see
generally Treanor, supra note 9, at 866-78 (discussing the views of public choice and
other legal theorists on political process failures affecting property interests).
115. Farber, supra note 9, at 289. But see Levmore, supra note 9, at 306-07
(maintaining that the victims of takings, like the owners of land condemned for a
highway or dam, are not likely to have much influence in the political process).
116. See Farber, supra note 9, at 289-90.
117. See id. at 285-86; Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 73, at 281-83; Michelman,
supra note 31, at 1216-17, 1234.
118. For a strenuous defense of private property rights and a call to Americans
to join the fight to ensure the continuing vitality of the Fifth Amendment, see DA-
vyi LUCAS, LucAS vs. THE GREEN MACHINE (1995).
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general to overestimate the constitutional strength of their
rights in deciding whether to proceed with a land-use option in
the face of uncertainty about whether the regulatory conduct
constitutes a taking. Alternatively, the psychology of the Tak-
ings Clause might cause a lawmaker to discount the public in-
terest justifying uncompensated regulation and use per se rules
or bright line tests that do not allow consideration of the public
interest in defining regulatory takings. 9
Finally, a legislative solution to regulatory takings probably
will not ensure avoidance of the constitutional question. Courts
have an obligation to resolve facial and fact-specific challenges
to government action raised under the Takings Clause.12 Such
challenges will still arise despite the existence of a legislative
solution. Assume, for example, that Professor Byrne's suggested
legislative approach is followed and that a statute is enacted
that vests a property right in a landowner upon issuance of a
site-specific building or development permit.12" ' If a permitting
authority in such a jurisdiction denies a permit to a landowner,
the owner may still challenge the permit denial as a deprivation
and taking of property in violation of the Constitution even
though no statutory taking exists. Further, even if an earlier
judicial decision did as Byrne suggests and eliminated the regu-
latory takings doctrine, a subsequent court could reexamine the
issue and decide anew whether the values and principles of the
Takings Clause required such a doctrine.
Legislative solutions to regulatory takings problems, in other
words, are too susceptible to bias and too limited by basic consti-
tutional principles to be effective. The potential for political, eco-
nomic, and personal influence means that a legislative solution
would not provide much comfort to those who lost under the so-
lution. Further, because of basic separation of powers principles,
the legislative branch could not be the final arbiter of constitu-
tionally based takings claims.'22
119. See S. 605, 104th Cong. § 204(a)(2)(B)-(D) (1995).
120. See U.S. CONST. art III; see generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 2 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1996) (dis-
cussing federal jurisdiction and the creation of Article III courts).
121. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
122. See generally ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 120, ch. 1 (discussing separation
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C. The Case Against Executive Branch Efforts To Define
Regulatory Takings Issues
Likewise, the executive branch, at least as currently config-
ured, 2' cannot be expected to define regulatory takings in a
way that reflects constitutional analysis and principles instead
of the political ideology of the elected leadership. The primary
executive branch tools for addressing the regulatory takings
problem, Executive Order 12,630124 and its accompanying
guidelines, allow the elected leadership to influence the goals
and priorities of federal agencies at the administrative level."
If, on the one hand, elected executive branch officials favor
greater protection of private property, then the executive order
provides a quiet and effective tool for dismantling, or at least
halting, environmental and other regulatory programs.2 ' Such
of powers and the origins of judicial review). In a 1976 article, Professor Michael Perry
argued that the judiciary is competent to-and should-define the constitutional basis of
the public welfare limit to the police power through the development of the substantive
due process doctrine. See Michael J. Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police
Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689, 692
(1976). He argued that, because it is removed from daily political conflicts, the judiciary
plays an important function in balancing competing interests under the Due Process
Clause by providing fundamental ethical principles to guide the political process. See id.
at 715-18. In contrast to those involved in the political process, the judiciary can take a
long-term view in construing open-ended constitutional concepts. See id.
123. One possible alternative for dealing with the regulatory takings problem is
the creation of a new judicial-type decision-making system either within the execu-
tive branch or as a separate administrative court independent of the executive
branch. This alternative system could be used to resolve regulatory takings and
other legal issues involving the regulatory programs of the federal administrative
system. For a discussion of a similar idea for the environmental policy-making pro-
cess, see ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 112, at 138-39.
124. 3 C.F.R. 554 (1989), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
125. See generally ROBERT A. SHANLEY, PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY (1992) (discussing how Executive Order 12,630 and other executive
orders have been used to influence the environmental agenda). For a recent discus-
sion of executive oversight of regulatory policy generally and of the politicization of
the executive branch, see RICHARD A. HARRIS & SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE POLITICS OF
REGULATORY CHANGE (2d ed. 1996).
126. See, e.g., SHANLEY, supra note 125, at 78-82 (discussing how the Reagan
Administration used Executive Order 12,630 to relieve businesses of some of the bur-
dens of environmental regulations). For further discussion of the order's effect, see
Jerry Jackson & Lyle D. Albaugh, A Critique of the Takings Executive Order in the
Context of Environmental Regulation, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,463 (Nov.
1988); James M. McElfish Jr., The Takings Executive Order: Constitutional Juris-
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executive branch action is not subject to the same level of public
scrutiny and political debate as legislative action or the same
decision-making process as judicial opinions, and therefore is not
as accountable to the public. Although the Supreme Court has
imposed some limitations on the use of executive orders,2 7 the
Court also has recognized the power of the President to
"resolv[e] the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved
by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in
light of everyday realities."" If, on the other hand, the elected
officials favor greater environmental protection, then the execu-
tive order primarily presents a paper hurdle that can be over-
come easily. Implementation and enforcement, after all, ulti-
mately are left to the heads of agencies, who are appointed by
the President.'29 Additionally, agency officials and staff are em-
broiled in the regulatory process and understandably might have
difficulty conducting rigorous and objective takings risk analysis
at the same time that they are meeting their normal regulatory
responsibilities-especially if the elected leadership favors great-
prudence or Political Philosophy?, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,474 (Nov.
1988); Robin E. Folsom, Comment, Executive Order 12,630: A President's Manipula-
tion of the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause to Achieve Control over Ex-
ecutive Agency Regulatory Decisionmaking, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 639 (1993).
127. See, e.g., Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 32-40 (1990) (concluding
that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) lacked authority to block the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA's) rule requiring businesses to
disclose critical health and safety information directly to third parties); Motor Vehi-
cle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 41-43 (1983) (deciding
that revocation of an agency regulation cannot occur without "reasoned analysis" and
"satisfactory explanation"); American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490,
506-13 (1981) (upholding OSHA's cotton dust regulation because Congress required
the agency to protect workers to the greatest extent feasible without conducting cost-
benefit analysis); cf Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566, 571
(D.D.C. 1986) (concluding that OMB did not have the authority to delay promulga-
tion of its regulations beyond its statutorily imposed deadlines).
128. Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
865-66 (1984); see generally LouIs FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 106-10 (3d ed. 1991) (discussing the authority of the
executive branch to use executive orders).
129. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see generally FISHER, supra note 128, at
23-52 (discussing the appointment powers of the President); 1 JACOB A. STEIN ET
AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 5.02[1] (1996) (describing the appointment process for top
agency officials).
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er environmental regulation. Just as it might be difficult to
expect objectivity from a property owner asked to examine the
external costs of her land use to the environment, it might be
difficult to expect objectivity from an agency asked to examine
its regulations for their takings impact.
Furthermore, the takings Executive Order has not become a
meaningful tool for resolving regulatory takings issues. The or-
der admittedly has caused the United States Attorney General
to develop detailed guidelines for assessing takings implications
in consultation with affected executive departments and agen-
cies. 3' It also has led to more systematic consideration of tak-
ings implications and property rights concerns, at least by the
agency officials responsible for takings implications assess-
ments.'3' It has not, however, led to a more clear or more prin-
cipled way to address the regulatory takings problem than that
developed by the courts-in large part because the order origi-
nated as and still remains a political tool of the executive
branch."2
Issued by President Reagan in 1988, Executive Order 12,630
was the last of several orders directed at minimizing the burden
of federal regulation on private interests.3 3 To achieve this
130. See Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 124, § 5(e)(2); Attorney General's
Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanticipated Takings (issued
June 30, 1988) (unpublished document) (on file with author) [hereinafter Attorney
General's Guidelines]; Attorney General's Supplemental Guidelines to Evaluate the
Risk and Avoid Unanticipated Takings for the U.S. Department of the Interior (issued
Mar. 29, 1989) (unpublished document) (on file with author) [hereinafter Attorney
General's Supplemental Guidelines for Interior]; Attorney General's Supplemental
Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanticipated Takings: Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (issued Jan. 14, 1993) (unpublished document) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Attorney General's Supplemental Guidelines for EPA].
131. See Attorney General's Guidelines, supra note 130, at 20-26 & app.; Attorney
General's Supplemental Guidelines for Interior, supra note 130, at 2-14 & apps. I, II;
Attorney General's Supplemental Guidelines for EPA, supra note 130, at 3-6, 12-13;
Division of Endangered Species, Fish & Wildlife Service, United States Department of
the Interior, Protecting America's Living Heritage: A Fair, Cooperative and Scientifically
Sound Approach to Improving the Endangered Species Act 1-3, 5-9 (Mar. 6, 1995) (unpub-
lished document) (on file with author) [hereinafter FWS Cooperative Approach to ESA.
132. See SHANLEY, supra note 125, at 49-89, 109-63.
133. See id- at 78-84. Express purposes of Executive Order 12,630 include pro-
moting "[riesponsible fiscal management and fundamental principles of good gov-
ernment" and reducing the risk of "unnecessary takings." Exec. Order No. 12,630,
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purpose, Executive Order 12,630 basically requires executive de-
partments and agencies'" to "identify the takings implications
of proposed regulatory actions and address the merits of those
actions in light of the identified takings implications, if any, in
all required submissions made to the Office of Management and
Budget."35 In notices of proposed rulemaking and messages
transmitting legislative proposals to Congress, executive depart-
ments and agencies also should identify and discuss
"[slignificant takings implications." 136 Finally, affected federal
departments and agencies are directed to "identify each existing
Federal rule and regulation against which a [tlakings award has
been made or against which a takings claim is pending"' and
to submit annually an itemized compilation of takings awards
entered against the United States.38
The potentially broad scope of the order is seen in its provi-
sions defining key terms and criteria. Under the order, policies
having takings implications include federal actions that "could
effect a taking" by limiting private property use or requiring ded-
ications by or exactions from private property owners.139 Fur-
ther, in addition to adhering to some general principles guiding
supra note 124, § 1(b).
134. For further discussion of federal departments and agencies affected by the
Executive Order, see Attorney General's Guidelines, supra note 130, at 8-9.
135. Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 124, § 5(b).
136. Id.
137. Id. § 5(c).
138. See id. § 5(d).
139. Id. § 2(a).
The phrase "[plolicies that have takings implications" does not include[:]
(1) [alctions . . . that lessen [ interference with the use of private prop-
erty; (2) [alctions [relating] to properties held in trust by the United
States or in preparation for or during treaty negotiations with foreign
nations; (3) [law enforcement actions involving seizure .. . of property
for forfeiture or as evidence in criminal proceedings; (4) [sltudies or simi-
lar efforts or planning activities; (5) [c]ommunications between Federal
agencies or departments and State or local land-use planning agencies
regarding planned or proposed State or local actions regulating private
property . . . ; (6) [tlhe placement of military facilities or military activi-
ties involving the use of Federal property alone; or (7) any military or
foreign affairs functions . .. but not including the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers civil works program.
Id. § 2(a)(1)-(7). For further discussion of the scope of the Executive Order, see At-
terney General's Guidelines, supra note 130, at 4-9.
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the formulation or implementation of policies that have takings
implications," executive departments and agencies must meet
more specific criteria when implementing an action that imposes
a condition on the granting of a permit, restricts the use of pri-
vate property, or regulates private property for the protection of
public health or safety." Two key criteria include the require-
ment that the action "[slubstantially advance" the appropriate
public purpose" and that the restriction or regulation "not be
disproportionate to the extent to which the [property] use con-
tributes to the overall [risk or] problem" being addressed by the
government action.' Through these specific criteria, the tak-
ings Executive Order provides the basis for restricting or even
preventing affected executive departments and agencies from
implementing actions having takings implications.'
Although a takings implication assessment (TIA)" 5 is classi-
fied as "internal" under the Executive Order " and the accom-
panying Attorney General's Guidelines, 47 and therefore is gen-
erally not published or made available to the public, 4 1 agency
actions reported in the Federal Register provide some evidence
of the type of consideration given to Executive Order 12,630 by
federal agencies. For example, 156 agency actions'4 ' explicitly
addressing the requirements of Executive Order 12,630 were
published in volumes 53-56 of the Federal Register for the years
1988-1991. A review of these actions suggests that, at least on
140. See Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 124, § 3.
141. See id. § 4(a)-(b), (d).
142. Id. § 4(a)(2), (d)(2).
143. Id. § 4(b), (d)(3).
144. See id. §§ 4-5.
145. The phrase "takings implication assessment" appears in the Attorney
General's Guidelines and not in the Executive Order. See Attorney General's Guide-
lines, supra note 130, at 2, 3.
146. See Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 124, § 6.
147. See Attorney General's Guidelines, supra note 130, at 2, 27. The Guidelines
also describe the evaluations conducted under the Executive Order as "predecisional."
Id. at 2, 3, 21, & app. at 2.
148. See McElfish, supra note 126, at 10,475.
149. The 156 agency actions included 65 final rules, 69 proposed rules, 16 notic-
es of rulemaking, and 6 interim rules. See infra p. 786 tbl.1. More detailed informa-
tion about the 156 actions is on file with the William and Mary Law Review and
may be obtained upon request.
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the surface, the Executive Order is not having much of an im-
pact. Published by twenty-one different agencies or administra-
tive units from eight departments, 5 ° the agency actions cover
a wide range of topics, including, among others, onshore and off-
shore oil and gas exploration, 5' use of public lands, 152 timber
sales,'53  wild free-roaming horses and burros,"5 financial
guarantee policies, 55 patent rights,55  testing procedures for
certain appliances,'57  designation of marine sanctuaries, 5 '
150. For a list of the agencies and departments involved, see infra p. 786 tbl.1.
151. See Onshore Oil and Gas Operations; Federal and Indian Oil and Gas
Leases; Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 8; Well CompletionslWorkovers/Abandon-
ments, 56 Fed. Reg. 20,568 (1991) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160 (1995)); Oil and
Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf, 55 Fed. Reg. 8485
(1990) (codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250 (1995)); Cordell Bank National Marine Sanctu-
ary Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 52,342 (1989) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 942).
152. See Permits, Leases and Trespass on Land Use Authorizations, 55 Fed.
Reg. 48,810 (codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 2920 & 9230); Grazing Administration Exclu-
sive of Alaska, 54 Fed. Reg. 31,484 (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 4100); Land Uses; Wil-
derness, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,795 (1988) (codified in final form at 36 C.F.R. pts. 251 &
293 (1996)) (proposed Sept. 28, 1988).
153. See, e.g., Sales Administration: Contract Modification-Extension-Assignment, 56
Fed. Reg. 28,850 (codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 5460 & 5470); Sale and Disposal of National
Forest System Timber;, Administration of Timber, Export and Substitution Restrictions,
56 Fed. Reg. 3354 (codified at 36 C.F.R. pts. 223 & 261); Sales of Forest Products; Gener-
al, and Conduct of Sales, 55 Fed. Reg. 22,916 (codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 5400 & 5440).
154. See Protection, Management, and Control of Wild Free-Roaming Horses and
Burros; Prohibited Acts, Administrative Remedies, and Penalties; Administrative Reme-
dies, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,372 (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 4770); Protection, Management, and
Control of Wild Free-Reaming Horses and Burros; Prohibited Acts, Administrative Reme-
dies, and Penalties; Administrative Remedies, 56 Fed. Reg. 786 (codified at 43 C.F.R. §
4770); Protection, Management, and Control of Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros;
Private Maintenance; Supporting Information and Certification for Private Maintenance
of More Than 4 Wild Horses or Burros, 55 Fed. Reg. 39,151 (codified at 43 C.F.R. §
4750); Protection, Management, and Control of Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros;
Supporting Information and Certification for Private Maintenance of More Than 4 Wild
Horses or Burros, 55 Fed. Reg. 3989 (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 4700).
155. See Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management,
56 Fed. Reg. 31,602 (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3800).
156. See Uniform Patent Policy for Domestic Rights in Inventions Made by Gov-
ernment Employees, 53 Fed. Reg. 39,734 (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 501 (1995)).
157. See Energy Conservation Program for Consumer Products; Test Procedures
for Refrigerators, Refrigerator-Freezers and Freezers, 54 Fed. Reg. 36,238 (to be codi-
fied at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430); Energy Conservation Program for Consumer Products; No-
tice of Proposed Rulemaking and Public Hearing Regarding Test Procedures for Re-
frigerators, Refrigerator-Freezers and Freezers, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,416 (to be codified at
10 C.F.R. pt. 430) (proposed Sept. 26, 1988).
158. See, e.g., Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary Regulations, 56 Fed.
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TABLE I
AGENCY ACTIONS ADDRESSING EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,630
FOR MAR. 15, 1988 THROUGH DEC. 31, 1991
Dep't/Agency # of Actions Final Rules Proposed Rules Notice of Interim Rules
Rulemaking
DOC, NOAA, NOS, 12 2 5 5 0
OCRM
DOC, Tech. Admin. 2 1 1 0 0
DOC, Travel & 2 1 0 1 0
Tourism
DOC, Under Sec. I 1 0 0 0
for Econ. Affairs
DOD, Corps 4 2 1 1 0
DOE, Off. of
Conserv. & 5 3 0 2 0
Renewable Energy
DOI, Bureau of 2 0 0 1 1
Indian Affairs
DOI, Bureau of 32 9 20 0 3
Land Mgm't. 32_9_20_0_3
DOI. Fish & 19 10 9 0 0
Wildlife Serv.
DOI, Minerals 39 21 16 2 0
Mgm't. Serv.
DO, National Park 7 2 5 0 0
Serv.
DOI, Off. of 4 1 3 0 0
Hearings & Appeals
DOI, Off. ofSec. 1 0 1 0 0
DOI, Off. of
Surface Min. & 3 1 2 0 0
Reclamation
DOI, DOI I 1 0 0 0
DOT, Off. of Sec. 3 2 0 1 0
DOT, Rcs. & 4 2 0 2 0
Special Programs
HSS, FDA 2 0 1 1 0
HUD, Off. of Sec. I 1 0 0 0
USDA, Food Safety 1 0 1 0 0
& Inspection Serv.
USDA, Forest Serv. 10 4 4 0 2
USDA, Off. of Sec. 1 1 0 0 0
TOTALS 156 65 69 16 6
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TABLE 2
TYPE OF LANGUAGE USED IN
AGENCY ACTIONS ADDRESSING EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,630
FOR MAR. 15, 1988 THROUGH DEC. 31. 1991
Dep'ltAgency # of Actions Generic Language* # Using Only Generic # Using Special
Language Explanation**
no takings 3
DOC, NOAA, NOS, 12 wouldn't have TI (e 5
OCRM (see notes A-C)
no TIA prepared I
DOC, Tech. Admin. 2 no significant TI w/i 2
meaning of EO
no TI w/i meaning of 2DOC, Travel & Tourism 2 0 (see notes D & E)
DOC, Under Sec. for no TI sufficient to s
Econ. Affairs frrequire prep. of TIA 0 Isee note F)
DOD, Corps of 4 doesn't require TIA b/c 0
Engineers won't affect use/value
DOE, Off. Conserv. & 5 no taking 0 4
Renewable Energy has been reviewed I (see notes G-I)
DOI, Bureau of Indian 2 no TIA necessary; 0 2
Affairs won't affect use/value (see note J)
DOI, Bureau of Land 32 not a taking 30 1
Mgm'L 3TIA not prepared I (see note K)
no TI; no significant TI 5
DOI, Fish & Wildlife 2
Senv. 19 no taking 11(see notes L & M)
no impacts subj. to EO 
DOI, Miners Mg'L not capable of
Semr. 39 interference; TIA not 31
___,._prepared (see notes N-S)
DOI, National Park no TI under EO I 4
Serv. 7 not require TIA 2 (see notes T-W)
DOI, Off. of Hearings & no TI requiring prep. of
Appeals TIA 4 0
DOI, Off. of Sec. I would not cause a taking 0 ((see note X)
DOI, Off. of Surface 3 TIA prepared 2 0
Min. & Reclamation excluded from coverage I
DOI, DOI I no TI 1 0
does not pose risk of
DOT, Off. of Sec. 3 taking of constitutionally 3 0
protected prop.
DOT, Res. & Special same lang. as DOT, Off.
Programs 4_ of Sec. 4
HSS, FDA 2 will not interfere w/ use 2
of prop.; no taking 0 (see notes Y& EE)
HUD, Off. of Sec. I no takings implications 0 1(see note AA)
USDA, Food Safety & h
Inspection Serv. I has takings implications 0 (see note Z)
USDA, Forest Serv. 10 no risk of taking 3 4
no TI; no sign. TI 3 (see notes K, BB-DD)
USDA, Off. of Sec. I same lang. as DOT, Off.
of Sec. 1
TOTALS 156 N/A 118 38
"Generic language" refers to boilerplate language used by the agency to reflect its general conclusions about takings.
* *The phrase "special explanation" refers to an explanation reflecting more specific takings conclusions about the agency action being
reviewed. Though the explanation typically is short, it explains why no takings problem exists in the context of the action that has
been adopted or proposed and in the context of takings standards. Some explanations include the agency's generic language. The
references to notes found in the "Special Explanation" column are to notes appearing in the Appendix to this article.
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TABLE 3
TAKINGS CONCLUSIONS REACHED IN
AGENCY ACTIONS ADDRESSING EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,630
FOR MAR. 15. 1988 THROUGH DEC. 31, 1991
Generic Language # & Type of
Dep't/Agency # of Actions Conclusion in SpecialExplanation# Cat. A* Cat. B # Cat. C Inconclusive Actions-
DOC, NOXA, NOS, 12 3 3 I 0 4 cat. A,
OCRM I/ inconcl.
DOC. Tech. Admin. 2 2 0 0 0 0
DOC, Travel & 2 0 0 0 0 2/cat. A
Tourism
DOC, Under Sec. for 1 0 0 0 0 I/ cat. A
Econ. Affairs
DOD, Corps 4 0 0 4 0 0
DOE, Off. Conserv. &
Renewable Energy 5 0 0 0 1 4/cat. B
DOI, Bureau of Indian 2 0 0 0 0 2/ cat. C
Affairs
DOI, Bureau of Land 32 0 30 I 0 1/ cat. C
Mgm't.
DOI, Fish & Wildlife 19 5 11 1 0 I/cat. A
Serv. I/cat. B
DOI, Minerals Mgm't. 39 0 0 31 0 8/ cat. C
Serv.
DOI, National Park 0 2 0 41 cat. A
Serv.
DOI. Off. of Hearings 4 4 0 0 0 0
& Appeals
DOI. Off. of Sec. 1 0 0 0 0 l/cat. B
DOI, Off. of Surface 3 0 0 1 2 0
Min. & Reclamation
DOI, DOI I I 0 0 0 0
DOT, Off. of Sec. 3 0 3 0 0 0
DOT, Res. & Special 4 0 4 0 0 0
Programs
HSS, FDA 2 0 0 0 0 21cat. B
HUD, Off. of Sec. 1 0 0 0 0 1/cat. A -
USDA, Food Safety & 0 0 1 possible taking
Inspection Serv. 1 0 0__0_1_ossibl _takin
2/ cat. A
USDA, Forest Serv. 10 3 3 0 0 1/ cat. B
1/ cat. C
USDA, Off. of Sec. 1 0 1 0 0 0
TOTALS 156 19 55 41 3 38
Categories A, B, and C are defined infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
** "Special explanation" is defined supra p. 787 Table 2.
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and food labeling requirements for juice beverages.159 One sig-
nificant omission from the list of agencies reporting on the tak-
ings Executive Order in the published actions is the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA). Though this omission is sur-
prising, given the number of regulatory programs that EPA
administers, it is consistent with the numerous exclusions in-
cluded in the 1993 Attorney General's Supplemental Guidelines
for EPA. 60
In all but one of the published actions, the drafting agency
either concluded that the relevant action did not raise takings
problems under Executive Order 12,630 (151 out of 156 actions)
or made no affirmative finding of a taking or of takings implica-
tions in the published action (4 out of 156 actions). 6' In almost
seventy-five percent of the actions (115 out of 156), the agency
typically used its own boilerplate or generic language161 to con-
clude that one of the following existed: (A) the action did not
raise significant or potential takings implications," (B) the ac-
Reg. 5282 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 940); Monterey Bay National Marine Sanc-
tuary Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,786 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 944); Flower
Garden Banks National Marine Sanctuary Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 7953 (to be cod-
ified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 943).
159. See Food Labeling; Declaration of Ingredients; Common or Usual Name for
Nonstandardized Foods; Diluted Juice Beverages, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,452 (codified in
final form at 21 C.F.R. pts. 101 & 102 (1996)).
160. See Attorney General's Supplemental Guidelines for EPA, supra note 130,
at 2-3, 6-11. In addition to the exclusions identified in the Executive Order and the
Attorney General's Guidelines, the Supplemental Guidelines for EPA provide numer-
ous categorical exclusions for policies and actions that the courts have concluded
"create no risk of takings liability." Id. at 2. These include EPA actions taken under
a number of environmental statutes. See id. at 8-10.
161. See supra p. 788 tbl.3.
162. The Attorney General's Guidelines allow each agency to determine the form
and manner of the takings implications assessments, as well as the ways in which
the obligations imposed by the takings Executive Order are to be integrated into
agency decision making. See Attorney General's Guidelines, supra note 130, at 3, 21,
23 & app. at 1. For a definition of "generic language," see supra p. 787 tbl.2.
163. Some of the actions put in category A stated that the action raised no
significant takings implications and therefore that no TIA was prepared. These ac-
tions were put in category A, instead of category C, because the main focus of my
review of the agency actions was whether the agency reached a conclusion about
takings risks or implications in response to Executive Order 12,630. Thus, the key
factor distinguishing categories A and C is that the actions in category A clearly
indicated that the agency affirmatively found no significant or potential takings
implications. For more information about the generic language typically used to state
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tion did not pose a takings risk,'.64 or (C) the action did not re-
quire a TIA.'" Approximately 26.3% of the published actions
(41 out of 156) summarily stated through generic language that
no TIA was necessary, without clearly or directly expressing a
judgment about takings implications or risks (category C); 35.3%
(55 out of 156) summarily concluded either that the action would
not cause a taking or that it posed no takings risk (category B);
12.2% (19 out of 156) summarily concluded that the action did
not raise significant or potential takings implications (category
A); and 1.9% (3 out of 156) were inconclusive in their use of
boilerplate language.' Only a few indicated that a TIA had
been done, but even those then stated that the TIA revealed no
significant takings."7 Of the remaining thirty-eight actions
a category A conclusion, see supra p.787 tbl.2; infra the Appendix.
164. Category B includes actions stating that no takings risk was posed or that no
taking existed. Some of the category B actions stated that the action would not cause a
taking or pose a takings risk and that no TIA was prepared. These actions were put in
category B, instead of category C, because of the conclusion reached about the absence of
a taking or risk of taking. Thus, the key factor distinguishing categories B and C is that
the actions in category B clearly indicated that the agency affirmatively found either no
taking or no risk of taking. For more information about the generic language typically
used to state a category B conclusion, see supra p.787 tbl.2; infra the Appendix.
165. Category C includes actions stating that no TIA was required or prepared, that
the action was exempt or excluded from the Executive Order, or that the action had no
impacts that were subject to the Executive Order. Some category C actions reached a
conclusion relevant to takings assessments but did not specifically state a finding of no
takings, takings implications, or takings risk. Thus, the common theme of category C
actions is that the drafting agency decided not to prepare or was not required to prepare
a TIA and did not clearly, directly, or affirmatively express a judgment about takings im-
plications or risks within the meaning of the Executive Order. For more information
about the generic language typically used in category C conclusions, see supra p.787
tbl.2; infra the Appendix. Categories A, B, and C are used supra p. 788 tbl.3 in describ-
ing takings conclusions reached by agency actions addressing Executive Order 12,630.
166. See supra p. 788 tbl.3.
167. See, e.g., Federal Lands Program; Areas Unsuitable for Mining;, Areas Des-
ignated by Act of Congress; Requirements for Coal Exploration, 56 Fed. Reg. 33,152,
33,163 (1991) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 740, 761 & 772) (proposed July 18,
1991); Regulations for the Management of Cabins on National Wildlife Refuges in
Alaska, 56 Fed. Reg. 19,074, 19,075 (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 36 (1995)); Areas Un-
suitable for Mining, Areas Designated by Act of Congress; Applicability of the Prohi-
bitions of the Surface Mining Act to the Surface Impacts of Underground Coal Min-
ing, 53 Fed. Reg. 52,374, 52,383 (1988) (codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 761 (1996)).
Without exhaustive research into how each action was handled, it appears to be
impossible to tell whether a TIA was conducted for those agency actions that do not
otherwise indicate the type of process used to comply with Executive Order 12,630.
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(which contained more specialized explanations), only one indi-
cated that it might cause a taking and suggested some alterna-
tives to minimize the problem;" subsequent actions relating
to this "possible taking" action, however, ignore the takings
Executive Order altogether.'69 Of the other thirty-seven ac-
tions, thirty-six contained specialized explanations of why the
particular action did not raise problems under the takings Exec-
utive Order, and one explained that procedures were being de-
veloped to implement the Executive Order."' For the most
part, even the specialized explanations were concise, usually
consisting only of a few sentences, though a few contained sever-
al paragraphs."' Four of these published actions, for instance,
explained that the relevant action would not have a severe
enough effect to deny economically viable use, 72 and one of the
Telephone Interview with Mariam McCall, Attorney-Advisor, Office of General Coun-
sel for Fisheries, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (July 17, 1996).
168. See Nutrition Labeling of Meat and Poultry Products, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,302,
60,364 (codified in final form at 9 C.F.R. pts. 317, 320 & 381 (1996)). On the same date
that the Food Safety and Inspection Service of the Department of Agriculture issued the
proposed rule indicating a possible taking, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of
the Department of Health and Human Services published a regulatory impact analysis
statement on the costs and benefits of food labeling regulations proposed by the FDA.
See Regulatory Impact Analysis of the Proposed Rules to Amend the Food Labeling Reg-
ulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,856. The agency observed that although the labeling require-
ments "may cause firms to alter names currently trademarked," no takings analysis was
necessary under Executive Order 12,630. Id. at 60,865. The FDA explained that "any
firm which will be forced to change the name of its product is now using terms that mis-
brand its products, and therefore no legal property right exists." Id.
169. See Nutrition Labeling of Meat and Poultry Products; Codification; Correction,
60 Fed. Reg. 10,304 (1995) (codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 317 & 381); Nutrition Labeling of
Meat and Poultry Products, 59 Fed. Reg. 30,875 (1994) (codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 317 &
381) (notice of extension of compliance date); Nutrition Labeling of Meat and Poultry
Products, 58 Fed. Reg. 632 (1993) (codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 317, 320 & 381); Intended Im-
plementation Date of Rulemaking for Nutrition Labeling of Meat and Poultry Products,
57 Fed. Reg. 10,298 (1992); Nutrition Labeling of Meat and Poultry Products, 57 Fed.
Reg. 10,298 (codified in final form at 9 C.F.R. pts. 317, 320 & 381).
170. See supra p. 788 tbl.3; infra the Appendix. The precise number of actions
having specialized explanations depends on how the reader distinguishes between ac-
tions using generic language and actions having specialized explanations. A few of
the actions contain statements that could be classified either as generic statements
or as brief attempts to explain why no takings problem exists. See, e.g., Coal Prod-
uct Valuation, 55 Fed. Reg. 35,427, 35,433 (1990) (codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 206)
(summarily concluding that "this rule will not affect the use of or the value of pri-
vate property" and therefore did not require a TIA).
171. See infra the Appendix (providing the specialized explanations).
172. See United States Travel & Tourism Administration Facilitation Fee, 56
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four also stated that the action would not affect existing lease
rights.7 ' A number of the published actions containing special-
ized explanations stressed that the particular agency action at
issue either would enhance existing rights and interests. or
would not affect them.'75 At least on the surface, then, the 156
published actions reveal that the Executive Order is not having
the severe impact on regulatory programs predicted by crit-
ics."'76 Even the actions that explained why no serious takings
problems exist used conclusory statements indicating compliance
with the Executive Order, while the one action that indicated a
possible taking was implemented nevertheless. 77
Because the TIA process is intended to be internal' and
Fed. Reg. 11,116, 11,119 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 1201) (proposed Mar. 15,
1991); Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 5282,
5289 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 940); Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary
Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,786, 31,793 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 944); Flower
Garden Banks National Marine Sanctuary Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 7953, 7957
(1989) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 943).
173. See Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg.
31,786, 31,793 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 944).
174. See, e.g., Removal of Federal Funding Limitation for State and Indian Co-
operative Agreements, 56 Fed. Reg. 10,510, 10,511 (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt.
228); Marine Mammals; Incidental Take During Specified Activities, 56 Fed. Reg.
7645, 7654 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 18) (proposed Feb. 25, 1991).
175. See Concession Contracts and Permits, 56 Fed. Reg. 41,894, 41,896 (codified
in final form at 36 C.F.R. pt. 51 (1996)); Food Labeling; Declaration of Ingredients;
Common or Unusual Name for Nonstandardized Foods; Diluted Juice Beverages, 56
Fed. Reg. 30,452, 30,464 (codified in final form at 21 C.F.R. pts. 101 & 102 (1996));
Interest Rate Applicable to Late Payment of Monies due the Government and Paid
on Late Disbursement of Revenues to States and Indians, 55 Fed. Reg. 37,227,
37,229-30 (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 218); Coal Product Valuation, 55 Fed. Reg.
35,427, 35,433 (codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 206 (1996)); Charges for Goods and Services
Provided to Non-Federal Users, 55 Fed. Reg. 19,637, 19,637 (codified at 25 C.F.R. pt.
143 (1996)); Land Uses; Wilderness, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,795, 37,796 (1988) (codified in
final form at 36 C.F.R. pts. 251 & 293) (proposed Sept. 28, 1988).
176. For critiques of Executive Order 12,630, see Jackson & Albaugh, supra note
126; McElfish, supra note 126; and Folsom, supra note 126.
177. See supra notes 161-65, 168-69 and accompanying text. Even when takings
concerns cause an agency to amend proposed actions, the concerns cannot necessarily
be attributed to Executive Order 12,630. A proposed rule to define valid existing
rights to mine coal, for example, was amended to reflect takings issues resolved
through litigation. See Federal Lands Program; Areas Unsuitable For Mining, Areas
Designated by Act of Congress; Requirements for Coal Exploration, 56 Fed. Reg.
33,152 (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 740, 761 & 772) (proposed July 18, 1991).
178. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
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does not require the preparation of lengthy documents, 17 9 the
process does not allow an outside observer to conduct an accu-
rate or complete evaluation of the impact of Executive Order
12,630. For example, the published actions reveal little, if any-
thing, about the TIAs that were performed, the internal process
used to conduct the assessments, the reactions of agency officials
to the TIAs, or the number of proposed agency actions, if any,
that were halted because of takings implications. 8 The out-
side observer, in other words, would not necessarily be able to
determine from the published actions whether the order's impact
was significant. Indeed, assuming that the order had such an
impact, agency actions published in the Federal Register
probably would not reflect significant takings implications. Thus,
it is difficult to tell whether the summary treatment given Exec-
utive Order 12,630 in published agency actions is due to the
order's negligible impact, to the incorporation of property rights
concerns into agency actions, or to the overall absence of any
significant regulatory takings problem in federal programs sub-
ject to the order.
Annual compilations of takings awards made against rules
and regulations of agencies in fiscal years 1985, 1986, and 1987
suggest that agency action did not pose a regulatory takings
problem, at least for those years. Submitted to the Office of
Management and Budget pursuant to Executive Order
12,63018 and disclosed in response to a Freedom of Informa-
tion Act request,' 2 the compilations reveal that no regulatory
takings awards were made against the government in those
years. "  Further, although the Justice -Department did file
Tucker Act takings awards figures of $23.1, $5.5, and $20.2
million for those three years, respectively, the "vast majority
were traditional nonregulatory takings."' Thus, at least for
179. See Attorney General's Supplemental Guidelines for Interior, supra note
130, at 3.
180. See supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text.
181. See Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 124, § 5(c).
182. See McElfish, supra note 126, at 10,478.
183. See id.
184. Id. The Tucker Act provides that the United States Claims Court "shall
have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States
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fiscal years 1985-1987, "no substantial record of takings by per-
mit or regulation" exists."8
In any event, the message to the outside observer from pub-
lished agency actions-whether accurate or not-is that the or-
der receives only superficial treatment and generally has not
resulted in a finding of significant takings implications in those
actions.8 ' A review of the guidelines accompanying the Execu-
tive Order provides some support for this interpretation. Al-
though the Attorney General's Guidelines reflect a serious com-
mitment to implementing the Executive Order, they place re-
sponsibility for conducting the TIAs and for determining the
"form and manner" of the TIAs on the individual agencies and
departments, 87  in particular on designated agency officials
who generally are not the agency program personnel drafting
the action." In addition, the general guidelines developed by
the Attorney General, as well as the more specific guidelines
developed for particular departments, provide for numerous
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation
or upon any express or implied contract with the United States." 28 U.S.C. §
1491(a)(1) (1994); see also Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 11-
12 (1990) (discussing whether the Tucker Act provides a remedy for takings).
185. McElfish, supra note 126, at 10,478.
186. Because Executive Order 12,630 requires notices of proposed rulemaking to
address significant takings implications and because the Attorney General's Supple-
mental Guidelines for the Department of the Interior require published rules to in-
corporate their TIA into all Determinations of Effects of Rules, the published actions
provide some support for the proposition that agencies are not generally finding sig-
nificant takings implications. See Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 124, § 5(b); At-
torney General's Supplemental Guidelines for Interior, supra note 130, app. I at 2.
The summary treatment given the Executive Order in the published actions, howev-
er, does not reflect the time-consuming efforts of agency staff to draft supplemental
guidelines, develop valuation methodologies, and prepare internal guidance for imple-
mentation. See McElfish, supra note 126, at 10,475.
187. See Attorney General's Guidelines, supra note 130, at 3 ("in a form and
manner chosen by the agency"); id. at 20 (designation of responsible agency official
is "solely within the discretion of the agency head"); id. at 21 ("in a form and man-
ner in the agency's discretion"); id. at 23 ("in a form and manner in the agency's
discretion"); id., app. at 1 (integrate "in ways to be determined by the agency").
188. The TIAs generally are conducted by each agency's counsel. See id., app. at
1 ("[tlhe takings implication consideration . . . will normally be one requiring close
consultation between agency program personnel and agency counsel."); Attorney
General's Supplemental Guidelines for Interior, supra note 130, app. I at 2 (desig-
nating the solicitor as the official responsible for TIAs).
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exclusions.'89 Finally, the guidelines tend to limit the TIA pro-
cess to facial challenges because of the absence of actual factual
settings.
190
On the other hand, executive branch efforts to address the
regulatory takings problem have resulted in greater sensitivity
to private property rights. The Attorney General's Guidelines,
for example, take a broad approach to defining both property
and the economic impact of regulations on property, assessing
the takings implications for "any distinct legally protected prop-
erty interest" 9' and examining the economic impact of the ac-
tion on the "property interest involved"192 and "each property
interest recognized by the applicable law."' 93 The Guidelines
also take an expansive view of regulatory takings, interpreting
some Supreme Court cases more broadly than may be neces-
sary." The Guidelines therefore err on the side of property
rights in defining regulatory takings.'95
Recent takings decisions of the Supreme Court indicate that,
even if a regulatory takings problem did not exist in the past, a
problem may arise in the future. Those decisions suggest a move
towards greater protection of property rights and reinforce the
psychological effect of the Takings Clause. One of those deci-
189. See, e.g., Attorney General's Guidelines, supra note 130, at 5-8; Attorney
General's Supplemental Guidelines for EPA, supra note 130, at 4-12; Attorney
General's Supplemental Guidelines for Interior, supra note 130, at 3-6 & app. IV.
190. See, e.g., Attorney General's Supplemental Guidelines for Interior, supra
note 130, app. III (providing a sample TIA).
191. Attorney General's Guidelines, supra note 130, at 9.
192. Id. at 14.
193. Id. at 18.
194. The Guidelines, for example, suggest that the merit review or nexus test of
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 834-37 (1987), applies gener-
ally to permit programs imposing conditions on private property owners, not just to
situations involving conditions resulting in a physical occupation or invasion. See At-
torney General's Guidelines, supra note 130, at 6-9.
195. Other evidence of greater sensitivity to property rights can be found in re-
cent agency documents providing for more cooperative or conciliatory approaches to
environmental protection. See, e.g., Issuance of Nationwide Permit for Single-Family
Housing, 60 Fed. Reg. 38,650 (1995) (effective Sept. 25, 1995) [hereinafter NWP for
Single-Family Housing Activities] (announcing issuance of nationwide permit autho-
rizing activities in wetlands related to the construction or expansion of single-family
homes); FWS Cooperative Approach to ESA, supra note 131, at 1, 3, 5-9 (describing
ways to assure fair treatment of landowners).
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sions, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,'96 reaffirms
the importance of diminution in value as a takings test by de-
claring a total diminution in value suffered by a property owner
as a result of a government regulation to be a per se taking.
197
A second decision, Dolan v. City of Tigard,9 8 adopts a new
merit or nexus test for evaluating the validity of regulations
affecting property owners under the Takings Clause and shifts
the burden of proof from the landowner to the government, at
least in certain types of regulatory situations. 9  Together, the
decisions provide landowners with reason to be hopeful about
the burdens imposed by government regulations and agency
officials with reason to be hesitant about the adoption of more
stringent regulations.
Lucas recast the diminution-in-value test as a per se rule when
the diminution is total."0 First developed by the Court in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,2"' the diminution-in-value test
recognizes that government action that does not physically occu-
py or appropriate property may nevertheless go too far in de-
priving the property owner of economically beneficial use.0 2
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia offered a number of possi-
ble justifications for the per se rule followed in Lucas. One pos-
sible justification is that a "total deprivation of beneficial use is,
from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical
appropriation."0 3 Additionally, when government action does
not allow a landowner to make economically viable use of the
land, government cannot be assumed to be "adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life"0 4 in order to secure the "average
reciprocity of advantage."0 5 Nor should the categorical rule in-
terfere with the effective functioning of government because,
according to Justice Scalia, the rule would only apply in rare sit-
196. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
197. See id. at 1015-19.
198. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
199. See id. at 386, 391 & n.8.
200. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-19.
201. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
202. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014-15.
203. Id. at 1017.
204. Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
205. Id. at 1018 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
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uations. °6 Finally, government action that deprives a landown-
er of all economically viable use carries "a heightened risk that
private property is being pressed into some form of public service
under the guise of mitigating serious public harm."2 7
Though the per se takings approach of Lucas is appealing
when considered in light of its justifications, the rule is problem-
atic because of a number of uncertainties surrounding its appli-
cation. The majority in Lucas, for example, did not clearly iden-
tify the appropriate property benchmark for measuring diminu-
tion in value. Because the majority assumed a total diminution
in value,"8 the Court did not have to determine how a total
diminution in value would be measured. In a footnote, however,
the majority suggested that the regulated portion may be the
appropriate property benchmark." 9 According to Justice Scalia,
the answer may be found:
[uIn how the owner's reasonable expectations have been
shaped by the State's law of property-i.e., whether and to
what degree the State's law has accorded legal recognition
and protection to the particular interest in land with respect
to which the takings claimant alleges a diminution in (or
elimination of) value. 10
In describing its per se rule, the Court also did not clearly
explain some important qualifications to the rule. According to
the majority, total diminution in" value requires compensation
"without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced
in support of the restraint" 1' unless the limitation "inhere[s]
in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles
of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon
land ownership."212 The limitation must "do no more than du-
plicate the result that could have been achieved in the
206. See id.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 1020 & n.9.
209. See id. at 1017 n.7.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1015.
212. Id. at 1029.
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courts-by adjacent landowners... under the State's law of
private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary pow-
er to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or other-
"213wise.
The per se approach of Lucas is also problematic because the
Court's explanation and justification of the approach reflect
changes in or inconsistencies with prior takings principles.214
First, in contrast to the per se approach to total diminution in
value announced in Lucas, the Court in Pennsylvania Coal had
stated that determining whether government action causing
diminution in value was a taking was a "question of degree
[which could not] be disposed of by general propositions."2 5
Second, a number of Supreme Court decisions had treated the
property as a whole, as opposed to the regulated portion alone,
as the appropriate property benchmark for measuring diminu-
tion in value.2"5 Third, the majority in Lucas described the
qualifications to its per se takings rule in ways that seem in-
consistent with traditional notions of the judicial process and
state law prerogatives. 27 For example, the Court stressed that
the state, on remand, must "identify background principles of
nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses [the landown-
er] now intends in the circumstances in which the property is
presently found."2"5 Further, these background principles must
be based on "an objectively reasonable application of relevant
precedents."219 This burden appears to lock in the state not on-
ly to the uses that the owner presently intends but also to back-
ground principles that presently exist. Judicial opinions that
213. Id.
214. See id. at 1063-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922); accord Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1063 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Subsequent cases reiterate the decision to
avoid an absolutist approach and to uphold laws under the Takings Clause even
though they render property valueless. See id. at 1064.
216. See Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508
U.S. 602, 643-44 (1993); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
497-502 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
217. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029, 1031.
218. Id. at 1031.
219. Id. at 1032 n.18.
220. See id. at 1068-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court's holding today ef-
fectively freezes the State's common law, denying the legislature much of its tradi-
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established new precedent by finding the uses to be harmful
through the normal evolution of the common law of nuisance
and property would appear to be beyond the scope of permissible
background principles. "2' Furthermore, the Court's burden "al-
ters the long-settled rules of review,"22 particularly the pre-
sumption of legislative validity ' Thus, when considered in
light of the Court's suggestion that the regulated portion may be
the appropriate property benchmark,"4 the Court's disagree-
ment with some of its prior takings cases, 2' and the Court's
limited view of the qualifications to the per se rule," the
majority's description of the total diminution-in-value situation
as a per se taking suggests greater protection of private property
rights.
The second opinion, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 27 heightened
the level of merit review applied to regulations affecting prop-
erty under the Takings Clause. According to the Court in Dolan,
a two-pronged test governs the legitimacy of government regula-
tions under the clause.2i Under the first prong, the Court
must "determine whether the 'essential nexus' exists between
the 'legitimate state interest' and the permit condition exacted
by the [government]. " " Under the second prong, the Court
must, after determining that the essential nexus test is met,
decide whether the "required degree of connection'o--a
"rough proportionality"il-emsts "between the exactions and
the projected impact of the proposed development."22 Although
the Court pointed out that this standard did not require a "pre-
cise mathematical calculation, " s the Court then stressed that
tional power to revise the law governing the rights and uses of property.").
221. See td. at 1052 n.15, 1054-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 1045 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
223. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
224. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
227. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
228. See id. at 386.
229. Id. (quoting Nollan v. Califorma Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 391.
232. Id. at 386.
233. Id. at 391.
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under the "rough proportionality" standard the government had
to "make some sort of individualized determination that the [re-
striction] is related both in nature and extent to the impact of
the proposed development." 4 The decision in Dolan represents
a clear shift in the allocation of the burden of proof from the
landowner to the government at least in land-use cases involv-
ing an adjudicative decision affecting a particular property own-
er, as opposed to land-use cases involving generally applicable
regulations."5
After Lucas and Dolan, agency officials conducting takings
implications assessments of proposed agency actions are more
likely to undervalue the public interest supporting more strin-
gent regulation of private property and the probability that more
stringent regulatory options would prevail under the Takings
Clause. 6 This discounting might be seen in decisions to with-
draw proposed agency actions, in the adoption of less stringent
regulatory options, or in the more favorable application of agen-
cy rules and regulations to property owners. 7 Though the tak-
ings Executive Order provides the formal vehicle for consider-
ation of takings implications," s judicial decisions are providing
234. Id. (footnote omitted).
235. See id. at n.8. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens described the ma-
jority as making a "serious error by abandoning the traditional presumption of con-
stitutionality and imposing a novel burden of proof on a city implementing an ad-
mittedly valid comprehensive land use plan." Id. at 405 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236. Cf. supra notes 84-96 (discussing the effect of the Takings Clause on land-
use decision making).
237. Some evidence of discounting existed prior to the Lucas and Dolan decisions.
The Attorney General's Guidelines that were issued in 1988, for example, state that the
purpose of the Executive Order and Guidelines is to "assure that governmental decision-
makers are fully informed of any potential takings implications of proposed policies and
actions" and thus to enhance the "cost-efficient administration of agency programs."
Attorney General's Guidelines, supra note 130, at 2. The Guidelines then recommend
that "[i]n those instances in which a range of alternatives are available, each of which
would meet the statutorily required objective, prudent management requires selection of
the least risk alternative." Id. As one commentator has noted, this recommendation is
"an interesting variation of risk assessment, which Congress more typically structures so
as to compel the agencies to adopt policies and regulations that produce the least risk to
public interests." McElfish, supra note 126, at 10,474. Some agency documents issued af-
ter the decisions, however, demonstrate a more formalized effort to work with property
owners. See, e.g., NWP for Single-Family Housing Activities, supra note 195; FWS Coop-
erative Approach to ESA, supra note 131, at 1, 3, 5-9.
238. See supra notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
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regulators with the ultimate principles for assessment and with
the increased incentive to use greater caution in regulating
property rights.2 9
Thus, although the takings Executive Order has had some
impact on the regulatory process, it is, first and foremost, a po-
litical tool. In response to the order, agency personnel have
shown greater sensitivity to property rights"' and have incor-
porated consideration of takings implications into their adminis-
trative process." Much of this impact, however, also could
have resulted from guidance received by the agencies from their
internal counsel and Department of Justice attorneys after their
review of recent takings decisions. Furthermore, the impact of
the takings Executive Order and of other executive branch ef-
forts to deal with regulatory takings issues through the adminis-
trative process ultimately depends on the political values of the
elected leadership. 2 Those leaders who favor greater protec-
tion of property rights and less regulation of private economic
interests will promote aggressive enforcement of the Executive
Order through a more demanding and centralized review pro-
cess, recognition of fewer exclusions, and more rigorous applica-
tion of criteria." Elected leaders who favor greater environ-
mental regulation, on the other hand, may repeal the Executive
Order, or, if some support for private property rights is pre-
ferred, may retain the order but enforce it less aggressively
through a less demanding assessment and review process, rec-
ognition of more exclusions, and more lenient interpretation of
principles and criteria.' The Executive Order, in other words,
provides a number of opportunities for political manipula-
tion. 5 Thus, the processes available to the executive branch
239.' See supra notes 196-236 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 195.
241. See McElfish, supra note 126, at 10,475 (discussing the agencies' implemen-
tation of the TIA requirements).
242. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
243. Cf. SHANLEY, supra note 125, at 49-89, 131-63 (discussing the use of execu-
tive orders in the Reagan and Bush Administrations and the impact of the orders
on environmental policy-making).
244. See id. at 83 ("[Executive orders] are . .. amended or sometimes revoked
by succeeding presidents of different partisan or ideological outlook.").
245. The definitions, standards, exclusions, TIA process, and degree of agency
1997] 801
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
are less well-suited to resolving takings issues and are corre-
spondingly less effective at doing so.
III. CONCLUSION AND PROLOGUE
For a number of reasons, then, the judicial branch is best able
to escape the politics of takings and provide the type of princi-
pled decision making needed in the regulatory takings ar-
ea-decision making that does not depend on the political values
of the latest elected leaders or the political incentives of the leg-
islative process. In addition to involving behavioral choices that
need the type of marginal analysis conducted by the courts, reg-
ulatory takings decisions implicate important protective and po-
litical theory functions of the Takings Clause. These functions
require the judiciary to be the primary takings decisionmaker.
Admittedly, a key danger in having the courts decide the reg-
ulatory takings question is that a judicial decision to provide
strong protection to traditional property rights and to curb envi-
ronmental and land-use regulations puts private land-use choic-
es beyond political controls. For this danger to arise, however, a
court must consistently adhere to the classical view of property
in the face of the Supreme Court's own precedent on the general
validity of police power regulation of property, on the need for ad
hoc determinations of takings, and on the normally
nondeterminative role of diminution in value. Furthermore, for
this danger to arise, a court must consistently override state
environmental and land-use laws and evolving common law con-
cepts of property and nuisance. Although all of these circum-
stances could arise, it is highly unlikely that they will.
The remaining articles in this Symposium issue provide inter-
esting and provocative perspectives on questions raised by the
regulatory takings debate--questions concerning the effective-
ness of the judicial branch in resolving regulatory takings cas-
es,246 the role of the majoritarian political process in resolving
discretion established by the Executive Order and accompanying guidelines all pro-
vide opportunities for strategic use of the order. See Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra
note 124, §§ 2-5; Attorney General's Guidelines, supra note 130, at 4-26; Attorney
General's Supplemental Guidelines for EPA, supra note 130, at 4-13; Attorney
General's Supplemental Guidelines for Interior, supra note 130, at 2-13 & app. IV.
246. See James E. Brookshire, The Delicate Art of Balance-Ruminations on
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regulatory takings issues," the value of ad hoc determinations
of takings,248 and the need for resolving debates over theory or
principle.249 The Symposium articles offer a rich diversity of
perspective and opinion on the regulatory takings problem. This
diversity includes significant variation in the fundamental ques-
tions posed, the substantive solutions proposed, and the analyti-
cal approaches used.
In his article Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings Jurispru-
dence Meets the Endangered Species Act,"0 for example, Mark
Sagoff focuses on the appropriate scope of judicial decision mak-
ing in the takings area and on whether the courts should resolve
theoretical and metaphysical disputes over conceptions of prop-
erty. Dr. Sagoff uses the context of recent Endangered Species
Act litigation to highlight the fundamental and conflicting con-
ceptions of property that fuel the regulatory takings debate.
Concluding that the Supreme Court should not be in the busi-
ness of adjudicating metaphysical disputes, Dr. Sagoff explains
that disputes over the fundamental character of property and its
relation to liberty, nature, and ecology involve political choices,
not judicial ones. Thus, instead of resolving metaphysical dis-
putes, the courts should limit themselves to "reining in regula-
tion at its own frontier" and ensuring that regulation does not
become extreme in any direction. 51 If the courts were to adopt a
general theory of takings, they would remove the incentive for
bargaining and accommodation. The Supreme Court thus is cor-
rect, in Dr. Sagoffs view, in "constrain[ing] land-use policy at
the margins while still permitting the political process to deter-
Change and Expectancy in Local Land Use, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1047 (1997);
Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces into the Takings Puzzle, 38
WAI. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1997); Sagoff, supra note 10, at 825.
247. See E. Donald Elliott, How Takings Legislation Could Improve Environmental
Regulation, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1177 (1997); Treanor, supra note 6, at 1151.
248. See Richard J. Lazarus, Counting Votes and Discounting Holdings in the
Supreme Court's Takings Cases, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1099 (1997); Sagoff, supra
note 10, at 825.
249. See Kmiec, supra note 246, at 995; James E. Krier, The Takings-Puzzle
Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143 (1997); Sagoff, supra note 10, at 825.
250. 38 Wt. & MARY L. REV. 825 (1997).
251. Id. at 845.
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mine its overall direction." 2 The uncertainty that exists be-
cause of the judiciary's ad hoc approach to regulatory takings
has a "moderating" effect, restraining regulation at the fringes
and giving parties a reason to cooperate." s For these reasons,
Dr. Sagoff believes that "[a] clear theory of regulatory takings is
not needed."2
Doug Kniec, in his article Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces
into the Takings Puzzle," also focuses on the role of the courts
in resolving takings disputes. He provides an interesting per-
spective on the implications of recent Supreme Court takings
decisions for judicial resolution of regulatory takings issues. The
key, according to Kmiec, is realizing that "judicial protection of
legitimate private property rights is not tantamount to inappro-
priate judicial theorizing about social policy." 56 Professor
Kmiec has no problem making this distinction because of what
he describes as the "objective, natural law basis of common law
property rights.""7 Private property "preexists government and
is protected not merely because this or that law may be in place,
but because it advances the nature of the human person more
effectively and directly than alternative forms of property
distribution." 8 Recent Supreme Court decisions have solved
the takings puzzle, according to Kmiec, by recognizing that the
natural law basis of common law property provides an objective
basis for judicial resolution of regulatory takings issues.
Jim Brookshire also focuses on the judiciary's role in defining
regulatory takings but from a different perspective: that of a prac-
ticing attorney who litigates takings cases and sees firsthand the
impact of takings decisions on private parties and governments.
In his article The Delicate Art of Balance-Ruminations on Change
and Expectancy in Local Land Use, 9 Mr. Brookshire evaluates
the effectiveness of judicial takings decisions by considering their
252. Id. at 849.
253. See id. at 850.
254. Id. at 851 (footnote omitted).
255. 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1997).
256. Id. at 997.
257. Id. at 998 (footnote omitted).
258. Id. at 998-99 (footnote omitted).
259. 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1047 (1997).
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impact on local land-use systems. He believes that judicial deci-
sion' making is effective in the takings area because it allows
local governments to balance change and expectancy in their
daily land-use decision-making process. He believes that the
"accommodation of change and expectancy occurs routinely
and... with increasing precision as the decision-making body
becomes more localized."26 The resulting "tradition of bridging
land-use goals and individual expectancy" demonstrates, in
Brookshire's view, the "remarkable... sensitivity [of the Court]
when resolving fundamental land-use issues .... ""'
In his essay Counting Votes and Discounting Holdings in the
Supreme Court's Takings Cases,26 Richard Lazarus focuses on
the predictive value of the Court's takings decisions by examin-
ing a dimension of regulatory takings decisions generally over-
looked: "Why the Court is so persistently splintered and its pre-
cedent so seemingly schizophrenic.""6 Understanding the im-
plications of recent takings cases requires one to pierce the
Court's "judicial veil" and realize that the Court is not a "mono-
lithic institution" but rather "nine individual Justices who speak
through the voice of shifting coalitions of at least five Justic-
es.""6 By piercing the judicial veil, regulatory takings lawyers
and scholars will recognize the need to identify the underlying
reasons for the Court's splintering and shifting majorities.2"
Identifying these reasons will reveal that the Justices are pulled
in different directions by crosscutting issues that make the de-
velopment of a stable majority on regulatory takings issues espe-
cially difficult to maintain.2" Piercing the judicial veil also will
reveal the types of arguments that might be persuasive to a new
majority coalition and the pragmatism that will be necessary to
maintain that majority.
Jim Krier's article, The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle,2 67 questions
260. Id. at 1048.
261. Id. at 1049.
262. 38 .Wu. & MARY L. REv. 1099 (1997).
263. Id. at 1100.
264. Id. at 1100-01.
265. See id. at 1101.
266. See id
267. 38 Wlf. & MARY L. REV. 1143 (1997).
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the ability of the courts-or anyone else for that matter-to ever
solve the takings puzzle. He argues that the regulatory takings
problem is intractable because of the ambiguities inherent in
takings cases. These ambiguities include uncertainty in the ap-
plication of general principles to particular situations, uncertain-
ty arising from "theoretical differences regarding what the gen-
eral principles should be," and uncertainty arising from "diver-
gent metatheoretical approaches to arguments over theory."2"
In Krier's view, the ambiguities inherent in regulatory takings
are so pervasive that people should not be puzzled that the tak-
ings puzzle cannot be solved.
The two remaining Symposium pieces-by Bill Treanor and
Don Elliott-focus on the need for a legislative solution to the
regulatory takings problem. In his essay The Armstrong Princi-
ple, the Narratives of Takings, and Compensation Statutes,269
Bill Treanor argues that a legislative solution is needed to fill
the gap created by process theories of the Takings Clause and to
deal with serious fairness concerns that tend to increase support
for flawed compensation bills already proposed. Proponents of
process theories argue that courts should defer to the
majoritarian political process in their resolution of regulatory
takings disputes unless process failure is suspected. As Professor
Treanor explains, a legislative response is especially needed in a
group of regulatory cases involving unanticipated regulations
that significantly destroy part of the total assets of a property
owner. Courts do not generally allow compensation in these cas-
es because the courts focus on harm to particular property, not
on harm to the property owner. Developing a legislative solution
for this particular type of regulatory takings problem would, in
Treanor's view, help to shift the debate about takings by provid-
ing redress for property owners "who, despite being greatly
harmed by regulation, have no hope of judicial redress. ....
without simultaneously making regulation impossible."2 0 Ig-
noring this regulatory takings problem would be a serious politi-
cal mistake because it would make more attractive the overly
268. Id. at 1147.
269. 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151 (1997).
270. Id. at 1157.
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broad proposals of the property rights movement.
The second article focusing on a legislative solution, Don
Elliott's How Takings Legislation Could Improve Environmental
Regulation,2 7' argues that a legislative solution could improve
environmental regulation and result in stronger environmental
laws. A legislative solution that clarified and expanded the right
to compensation would minimize unnecessary burdens on prop-
erty owners, therefore increasing distributive fairness and pos-
sibly decreasing political opposition. Such a solution also would
spread out the costs of environmental regulation over a larger
portion of the citizenry and would give government greater in-
centive to exercise care in drafting environmental regulations.
The diversity of opinions and perspectives offered by the Sym-
posium articles helps to provide a more complete picture of the
texture and richness of the regulatory takings debate. The diver-
sity also reveals how difficult it is to find a solution to the regu-
latory takings problem. If experts in the area cannot even agree
on whether a problem exists or a solution is possible, then how
can one ever expect satisfactory resolution of regulatory takings
issues? A possible answer to this question was suggested by my
article and would require a change in expectations about the
nature and type of solution that realistically might be possible.
271. 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1177 (1997).
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APPENDIX: SPECIAL EXPLANATIONS USED IN AGENCY
ACTIONS ADDRESSING EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,630 FOR
MARCH 15, 1988 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1991
NOTES*
NOTE A
E.O. 12630. This E.O. requires that each Federal agency pre-
pare a Takings Implications Assessment (TIA) for any of its ad-
ministrative, regulatory, and legislative policies and actions that
affect, or may affect, the use or value of any real or personal
private property. These policies include regulations that propose
or implement licensing or permitting requirements, conditions,
or restrictions otherwise imposed by an agency on the use of pri-
vate property, and actions relating to, or causing the physical
occupancy or invasion of, private property. DOC is developing
procedures to implement the requirements of this E.O.; these
regulations will be appropriately amended to implement the
DOC procedures when they become available.'
NOTE B
This proposed rule, if issued in final form as proposed, would
not have any takings implications within the meaning of Execu-
tive Order 12630 because it would not appear to have an effect on
private property sufficiently severe as to effectively deny econom-
ically viable use of any distinct legally potential property interest
to its owner or to have the effect of, or result in, a permanent or
temporary physical occupation, invasion, or deprivation.2
* The passages following each lettered note are taken verbatim from the
indicated agency action or actions.
1. Style Guide, Regional Fishery Management Councils, Other Applicable Law,
Guidelines for Council Operations and Administration, 54 Fed. Reg. 1700, 1711
(1989) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 600, 601, 604 & 605).
2. Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 5282,
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NOTE C
This proposed rule, if issued in final form as proposed, would
not have takings implications within the meaning of Executive
Order 12630 because it would not appear to have an effect on
private property sufficiently severe as effectively to deny eco-
nomically viable use of any distinct legally potential property
interest to its owner or to have the effect of, or result in, a per-
manent or temporary physical occupation, invasion, or depriva-
tion. While the prohibition on the exploration, development, pro-
duction of oil, gas and minerals from the Sanctuary might have
a takings implication if it abrogated an existing lease for OCS
[Outer Continental Shelf] tracts within the proposed Sanctuary
or an approval of an exploration or development and production
plan, no OCS leases have been sold for tracts within the pro-
posed Sanctuary and no exploration or production and develop-
ment plans have been filed or approved.3
NOTE D
This final rule does not have takings implications within the
meaning of Executive Order 12630 because it would not appear
to have an effect on private property sufficiently severe as effec-
tively to deny economically viable use of any distinct legally po-
tential property interest to its owner or to have the effect of, or
result in, a permanent or temporary physical occupation, inva-
sion, or deprivation.4
NOTE E
These proposed regulations do not have takings implications
within the meaning of Executive Order 12630 because they
5289 (1991) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 940); accord Flower Garden Banks Na-
tional Marine Sanctuary Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 7953, 7957 (to be codified at 15
C.F.R. pt. 943).
3. Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 47,836,
47,843 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 925); accord Monterey Bay National Marine
Sanctuary Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,786, 31,793 (1990) (to be codified at 15
C.F.R. pt. 944).
4. United States Travel and Tourism Administration Facilitation Fee, 56 Fed.
Reg. 176, 179 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 1201).
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would not appear to have an effect on private property suffi-
ciently severe as effectively to deny economically viable use of
any distinct legally potential property interest to its owner or to
have the effect of, or result, [sic] in, a permanent or temporary
physical occupation, invasion, or deprivation.5
NOTE F
The changes in the process of determining employee rights to
inventions made by this rule do not have takings implications
sufficient to require preparation of a Takings Implications As-
sessment under Executive Order 12630.6
NOTE G
Executive Order 12630 (53 FR 8859, March 18, 1988) directs
that, in proposing a regulation, an agency conduct a "takings"
review. Such a review is intended to assist agencies in avoiding
unnecessary takings and help such agencies account for those
takings that are necessitated by statutory mandate.
For purposes of the Order:
"Policies that have takings implications" refers to Federal reg-
ulations, proposed Federal regulations, proposed Federal legisla-
tion, comments on proposed Federal legislation, or other Federal
policy statements that, if implemented or enacted, could effect a
taking, such as rules and regulations that propose or implement
licensing, permitting, or other condition requirements or limita-
tions on private property use, or that required [sic] dedications
or exactions from owners of private property.
It appears that there are three parts of the appliance stan-
dards program that could conceivably be viewed as having "tak-
ings implications." These are testing (certification) requirements,
the impacts of standard levels, and possible DOE testing of
products for validation.
This rulemaking is concerned with the first part, namely test-
5. United States Travel and Tourism Administration Facilitation Fee, 56 Fed.
Reg. 11,116, 11,119 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 1201) (proposed Mar. 15, 1991).
6. Uniform Patent Policy for Domestic Rights in Inventions Made by Government
Employees, 53 Fed. Reg. 39,734, 39,735 (1988) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 501 (1995)).
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ing. The Department believes that such a requirement does not
constitute a "taking" of private property. The establishment of
test procedures involves no exchange of property. Manufacturers
maintain control of the property for all intents and purposes.
Therefore, the Department believes that the requirement of
testing and the establishment of test procedures as part of the
appliance standards program do not represent a "taking" under
the provisions of E.O. 12630.7
NOTE H
Executive Order 12630 (53 FR 8859, March 18, 1988) directs
that, in proposing a regulation, an agency conducts a "takings"
review. Such a review is intended to assist agencies in avoiding
unnecessary takings and help such agencies account for those
takings that are necessitated by statutory mandate.
For purposes of the Order:
"Policies that have takings implications" refers to Federal
regulations, proposed Federal regulations, proposed Federal
legislation, comments on proposed Federal legislation, or other
Federal policy statements that, if implemented or enacted, could
effect a taking, such as rules and regulations that propose or
implement licensing, permitting, or other condition requirements
or limitations on private property use, or that require dedica-
tions or exactions from owners of private property.
It appears that there are three parts of the appliance stan-
dards regulatory program that should be reviewed for "takings
implications." These are testing and certification requirements,
the impacts of standard levels, and possible DOE testing of
products for validation.
With regard to the first part, namely, testing and certification,
the Department believes that such a requirement, implementing
a long-established statutory mandate in a manner calculated to
7. Energy Conservation Program for Consumer Products; Test Procedures for Re-
frigerators, Refrigeration-Freezers and Freezers, 54 Fed. Reg. 36,238, 36,239-40 (to be
codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430); accord Energy Conservation Program for Consumer
Products; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Public Hearing Regarding Test Proce-
dures for Refrigerators, Refrigerator-Freezers, and Freezers, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,416,
37,420 (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430) (proposed Sept. 26, 1988).
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minimize adverse economic impacts does not constitute a "tak-
ing" of private property. Executive Order 12630 applies to those
regulatory actions which are a substitute for the exercise of
governmental eminent domain power. This applies to situations
where regulations exact a transfer of title, possession, or benefi-
cial use of private property without compensation. The regula-
tions under consideration are simply an exercise of police power
and do not exact such a transfer of private property.
Similarly, the Department's possible validation testing does
not constitute a "taking," within the limitation described above.
The Department believes that the fact that while an energy
conservation standard may limit some manufacturers in the
range of appliance efficiencies that they can produce, such nar-
rowing of the energy efficiency range does not constitute a "tak-
ing" in the sense described above. Furthermore, this rulemaking
simply recites the standards explicitly mandated by the Act.
In short, in none of the three parts of the appliance standards
program does the Department believe that the provisions of E.O.
12630 pertain.'
NOTE I
Executive Order 12630 (53 FR 8859, March 18, 1988) directs
that, in proposing a regulation, an agency conduct a "takings"
review. Such a review is intended to assist agencies in avoiding
unnecessary takings which might require compensation under
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. For
purposes of Executive Order 12630, "policies that have takings
implications" refers to Federal regulations, proposed Federal
regulations, proposed Federal legislation, comments on proposed
Federal legislation, or other Federal policy statements that, if
implemented or enacted, could effect a taking, such as rules and
regulations that propose or implement licensing, permitting, or
other condition requirements or limitations on private property
use, or that require dedications or exactions from owners of
private property.
8. Energy Conservation Program for Consumer Products: Final Rulemaking Re-
garding Regulations Related to Energy Conservation Standards for Consumer Prod-
ucts, 54 Fed. Reg. 6062, 6073-74 (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430).
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The test procedure proposed today is required by the Act and
will substantially advance the statutory objective of promoting
appliance energy efficiency through dissemination of better in-
formation in the marketplace. Moreover, the proposed test proce-
dure would have minimal economic impact on manufacturers.
Therefore, the Department believes that the establishment of
fluorescent lamp ballast test procedures as part of the Program
does not represent a "taking" under the provisions of Executive
Order 12630 cited above
NOTE J
The Department has determined that the promulgation of this
rule to authorize the BIA to charge non-Federal users for
goods/services delivered to them by the BIA will "not affect the
use or value of private property" as contemplated by Executive
Order 12630, 3 CFR 554 (1988 Comp.). Therefore, no Takings
Implication Analysis is necessary, and none has been pre-
pared.'"
NOTE K
The proposed rule has been considered in light of Executive
Order 12630 concerning possible impacts on private property
rights. Executive Order 12630 exempts from takings implica-
tions assessments, activities which are consensual in nature
between the United States and non-Federal parties. Exchanges
are consensual and, therefore, do not raise taking issues. Accord-
ingly, no further consideration of takings implications was
deemed necessary in this proposed rule."
9. Energy Conservation Program for Consumer Products; Test Procedures for
Fluorescent Lamp Ballasts, 55 Fed. Reg. 7719, 7723 (1990) (to be codified at 10
C.F.R. pt. 430) (proposed Mar. 5, 1990).
10. Charges for Goods and Services Provided to Non-Federal Users, 55 Fed. Reg.
19,637, 19,637 (codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 143 (1996)); accord Charges for Goods and
Services Provided to Non-Federal Users, 55 Fed. Reg. 19,620, 19,621 (codified at 25
C.F.R. pt. 143).
11. Exchanges-General Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 49,962, 49,968 (1991) (to be codi-
fied at 43 C.F.R. pts. 2090 & 2200) (proposed Oct. 2, 1991); accord Land Exchanges,





This proposed rule is not expected to have a potential takings
implication under Executive Order 12630 because it would au-
thorize take of walruses and polar bears by oil and gas explo-




Comment: One commenter argued against any interpretation
of section 101(a)(5) of the Act that would exempt persons from
the criminal provisions of the Act. They cited the following lan-
guage from the Proposed Rule as reason for their concern:
This proposed rule is not expected to have a potential takings
implication under Executive Order 12630 because it would au-
thorize take of walruses and polar bears by oil and gas explo-
ration companies and thereby exempt them from civil and crimi-
nal liability. 56 FR 7654, February 25, 1991.
Response: The statement cited by the commenter applies to
potential takings implications that are analyzed under Executive
Order 12630 of March 15, 1988. This Executive order is entitled
"Governmental Actions and Interference With Constitutionally
Protected Property Rights," and is commonly referred to as the
"Takings Executive Order." The Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. Government historical-
ly has used the formal exercise of the power of eminent domain,
which provides an orderly process for paying just compensation,
to acquire private property for public use. Recent Supreme Court
decisions, however, in reaffirming the fundamental protection of
private property rights provided by the Fifth Amendment and in
assessing the nature of governmental actions that have a confis-
catory impact on constitutionally protected property rights, have
also reaffirmed that, under certain circumstances, governmental
actions that do not formally invoke the condemnation power,
including regulations, may result in a taking for which just com-
12. Marine Mammals; Incidental Take During Specified Activities, 56 Fed. Reg.
7645, 7654 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 18) (proposed Feb. 25, 1991).
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pensation is required.
The purpose of Executive Order 12630 is to assist Federal
agencies in undertaking reviews to evaluate the effect of their
administrative, regulatory and legislative actions on constitu-
tionally protected property rights. In this regard, the Service has
determined that its regulatory action will not result in taking
away any operator's oil and gas lease(s). In fact, a contrary argu-
ment can be made that this action, as provided for in section
101(a)(5) of the Act, actually enhances oil and gas operators'
ability to avail themselves of the property rights that convey
with oil and gas lease purchases.
3
NOTE N
Because this rule will not affect the use of or the value of pri-
vate property, the Department certifies that the rule does not
represent a governmental action capable of interference with
constitutionally protected property rights. Thus, a Takings Im-
plication Assessment need not be prepared pursuant to Execu-
tive Order 12630, "Government Action and Interference with
Constitutionally Protected Property Rights.""
NOTE 0
Because this rule would result in an increase in funds to
States and Indian tribes that have entered into a cooperative
agreement, the Department certifies that the rule does not rep-
resent a governmental action capable of interference with consti-
tutionally protected property rights. Thus, a Takings Implication
Assessment need not be prepared pursuant to Executive Order
12630, "Government Action and Interference with Constitution-
ally Protected Property Rights." 5
13. Marine Mammals; Incidental Take During Specified Activities, 56 Fed. Reg.
27,443, 27,462 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 18).
14. Coal Product Valuation, 55 Fed. Reg. 35,427, 35,433 (codified at 30 C.F.R. pt.
206 (1996)); accord Revision of Coal Product Valuation Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg.
5024, 5028 (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 206).
15. Removal of Federal Funding Limitation for State and Indian Cooperative
Agreements, 56 Fed. Reg. 10,510, 10,511 (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 228); accord




This rulemaking clarifies an ambiguity in existing regulations
and will result in an increase in interest paid by MMS to the
States and Indians. There is no change in the interest rate paid
by lessees and other payors for late payment of interest. There-
fore, the Department certifies that the rule does not represent a
governmental action capable of interference with constitutionally
protected property rights. Thus, a Takings Implication Assess-
ment need not be prepared pursuant to Executive Order 12630,
"Government Action and Interference with Constitutionally Pro-
tected Property Rights." 6
NOTE Q
Because there are no additional economic effects, this final
rule does not represent a governmental action capable of inter-
ference with constitutionally protected property rights. Thus, a
Takings Implication Assessment need not be prepared pursuant
to Executive Order 12630, "Government Action and Interference
with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights."'
NOTE R
Because this rule is a technical correction only and is not a
substantive change, the Department certifies that the rule does
not represent a governmental action capable of interference with
constitutionally protected property rights. Thus, a Takings Im-
plication Assessment need not be prepared pursuant to Execu-
tive Order 12630, "Government Action and Interference with
Constitutionally Protected Property Rights." 8
ments, 55 Fed. Reg. 32,448, 32,449 (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 228) (proposed
Aug. 9, 1990).
16. Interest Rate Applicable to Late Payment of Monies Due the Government and
Paid on Late Disbursement of Revenues to States and Indians, 55 Fed. Reg. 37,227,
37,229-30 (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 218).
17. Serving of Official Correspondence Issued By the Royalty Management Pro-
gram, 56 Fed. Reg. 5946, 5949 (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 243).
18. Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing, 56 Fed. Reg. 23,647, 23,647-48
(to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 260).
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NOTE S
Because this rulemaking clarifies existing regulations, the
Department certifies that the rule does not represent a govern-
mental action capable of interference with constitutionally pro-
tected property rights. Thus, a Takings Implication Assessment
need not be prepared pursuant to Executive Order 12630, "Gov-
ernment Action and Interference with Constitutionally Protected
Property Rights." 9
NOTE T
The National Park Service has reviewed this rule as directed
under Executive Order 12630, "Governmental Actions and Inter-
ference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights," to de-
termine if this rule has "policies that have taking implications."
The Service has determined that the proposed rule does not
have taking implications since it regulates activities on federal
land."°
NOTE U
The Service has reviewed this rule as directed by Executive
Order 12630, "Governmental Actions and Interference with Con-
stitutionally Protected Property Rights" to determine if this rule
has policies that have taking implications. The Service has de-
termined that there are no taking implications because the regu-
lations only describe the means by which the National Park Ser-
vice awards and administers concession contracts and permits.
The proposed rules do not affect private property interests with-
in the meaning of the Executive Order."
19. Amendment of Valuation Benchmarks in Gas Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,724,
64,726 (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 206) (proposed Dec. 12, 1991).
20. Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks; Fishing Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg.
45,619, 45,620 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 7) (proposed Oct. 30, 1990).
21. Concession Contracts and Permits, 56 Fed. Reg. 41,894, 41,896 (codified in




The Service has reviewed this rule as directed by Executive
Order 12630, "Governmental Actions and Interference with Con-
stitutionally Protected Property Rights," to determine if this rule
has "policies that have taking implications." The Service has
determined that the rule does not because the rule is a modifica-
tion of an existing rule which "lessens interference with the use
of private property." The changes in the rule which demonstrate
this lessening of interference area [sic]:
1. The reduction in minimum lot size to 4000 square feet for
existing lots, which means that many property owners who have
variances solely for insufficient lot size will now conform to fed-
eral standards;
2. The elimination of the limitation on bathrooms in a private
residence;
3. The change in minimum elevation to conform to the FEMA
standards;
4. The revision of lot occupancy standards; and
5. The elimination of the prohibition on in-ground swimming
pools.
Properties that were previously subject to federal condemna-
tion solely because of the deviations from the rule that these
changes effect will now be exempt from federal condemnation.
This results in more property conforming to the federal stan-
dards than under the previous rule.2
NOTE W
The Department of the Interior has reviewed this rule as di-
rected by Executive Order 12630, "Governmental Actions and
Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights," to
determine if this rule has "policies that have takings implica-
tions." The Department has determined that this proposed rule
does not have takings implications because it will not have an
effect on private property sufficiently severe as to effectively de-
ny economically viable use of any distinct legally protected prop-
22. Fire Island National Seashore, New York; Federal Zoning Regulations, 56 Fed.
Reg. 42,788, 42,790 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 28).
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erty interest to its owner, or to have the effect of, or result in, a
permanent or temporary physical occupation, invasion, or depri-
vation. National natural landmark designation does not change
ownership of property, and does not dictate use of property so
designated. The effect of the modifications proposed in this
rulemaking are to strengthen and clarify procedures for owner
notification that properties are being considered, to explicitly
require that no entry onto property for purposes of the program
will occur without owner permission, and to require owner con-
sent prior to NNL designation by the Secretary.'
NOTE X
Additionally, no Takings Implication Analysis pursuant to
Executive Order 12630 is required. The DOI has determined
that the order would not cause a taking of private property inas-
much as leases issued prior to its promulgation would be subject
to its provisions only upon the election or consent of the affected
lessees.24
NOTE Y
Under Executive Order 12630 (53 FR 8859), FDA considered
whether this proposed rule would affect the value, or constitute
a taking, of private property (e.g., trade names for juice products
that are consistent with law). FDA believes that this proposed
rule, if adopted, will not interfere with the use of private proper-
ty in any way. Therefore, the agency has tentatively concluded
that no taking would occur. FDA requests comments on whether
this regulation would have an impact on private property. The
agency will consider all comments on this issue before issuing a
final rule based on this proposal."
23. National Natural Landmarks Program, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,790, 58,792-93 (to be
codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 62) (proposed Nov. 21, 1991).
24. Oil, Gas, and Potash Leasing and Development Within the Designated Potash
Area of Eddy and Lea Counties, NM, 56 Fed. Reg. 5697, 5698 (proposed Feb. 12, 1991).
25. Food Labeling; Declaration of Ingredients; Common or Usual Name for Non-
standardized Foods; Diluted Juice Beverages, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,452, 30,464 (codified in




A rule that requires companies to revise product labels has
"takings implications" as defined under Executive Order 12630.
Label inventories are private property. Inventories that are not
exhausted by an effective date become non-compliant labels that
would be essentially worthless and presumably discarded.
Executive Order 12630 requires that before taking private
property for the protection of public health, the Department con-
sider (1) the risk created by the property and (2) the potential
cost to the government in the event that a court later deter-
mines that the action constituted a taking.
In this rulemaking, the relative public health risks and poten-
tial costs are both relatively small. The non-compliant labels
represent a risk in that consumers would consume unknown
levels of fat and cholesterol which could be higher than intended
or perceived. Given the uncertainties concerning diet and health
and the timeframes over which diet is expected to affect health,
the unused inventories present a relatively small risk.
At the same time, the potential costs are relatively small.
Based on Table 17 in Chapter IV, the label inventory transition
costs for labels that would not be used before a 6-month compli-
ance date would be $22.6 million. Similar costs for a 12-month
compliance period would be $11.3 million.
Existing departmental guidance recommends considering fea-
sible alternatives to the proposed action which would reduce the
impact upon private property. The costs associated with unused
label inventory could be reduced by allowing firms to either (1)
use all existing label inventory that was procured prior to the
proposal date, or (2) use existing inventory that includes some
nutrition information.26
NOTE AA
The General Counsel, as Designated Official under Executive
Order 12630, Government Actions and Interference with Consti-
tutionally Protected Property Rights, has determined that this
26. Nutrition Labeling of Meat and Poultry Products, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,302, 60,364
(codified in final form at 9 C.F.R. pts. 317, 320 & 381 (1996)).
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final rule does not have "takings implications," as defined in
HUD's "Supplemental Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and
Avoidance of Unanticipated Takings." The final rule does not
deny the owner an economically viable use for the project. In-
stead, the owner will, at a minimum, maintain ownership of the
project with the below market rate mortgage or rental subsidies
in place; in addition, the owner may be eligible to receive incen-
tives to enhance the economic benefits of maintaining the project
as low income housing. Moreover, the burden imposed by the
statute and the final rule is limited by the statute's sunset pro-
vision.
NOTE BB
This rule has been reviewed for its effects on private property
rights in accordance with Executive Order 12630 concerning the
just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment and has been
found not to have significant takings implications. These rules
apply principally to the use of Federal land, not private land.
Existing access rights across National Forest lands are not af-
fected. The law requires that owners of non-federally owned land
be granted access to such lands, provided, the owner complies
with rules and regulations applicable to ingress or egress to or
from the National Forest System. This rule provides those terms
and conditions."8
NOTE CC
This rule has been reviewed for its effects on private property
rights in accordance with Executive Order 12630 concerning the
just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment and has been
found not to have significant takings implications. These rules
apply principally to the use of Federal land, not private land.
Existing access rights across National Forest lands are not af-
fected.
27. Prepayment of a HUD-Insured Mortgage by an Owner of Low Income Housing, 55
Fed. Reg. 38,944, 38,952 (1990) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 50, 221, 236, 241 & 248).
28. Land Uses; Wilderness, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,795, 37,796 (1988) (codified in final
form at 36 C.F.R. pts. 251 & 293 (1996)).
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Section 1323(a) of ANILCA and other earlier laws did not cre-
ate any new property rights, only a mechanism to obtain access.
The law requires that owners of non-federally owned land be
granted access to such lands, provided the owner complies with
rules and regulations applicable to ingress or egress to or from
the National Forest System. This rule provides those terms and
conditions for the occupancy and use of National Forest land,
not private land. Therefore, the rules are not a taking of private
rights and do not have significant taking implications.29
NOTE DD
Executive Order 12630 requires agency decisionmakers to
consider the effect of proposed agency actions on private proper-
ty rights. Pursuant to section 501(a)(1) of ANILCA, this final
rule provides for a consistency determination of multiple use
management activities with the conservation of fish and wildlife
and their habitat on National Forest System lands in the Copper
River-Rude River and the Copper River-Bering River areas of
the Chugach National Forest in Alaska. Since consistency deter-
minations are subject to valid existing rights, including those of
Alaska Natives, no private property will be taken as a result of
this proposed final rule.
Therefore, this rule presents no risk of takings liability."
NOTE EE
Loss of trademark names. Both the percent juice labeling
document and the nutrient content claim definitions document
may cause firms to alter names currently trademarked. Under
Executive Order 12630, a "takings" analysis would be necessary
if, in fact, this constituted a potential taking. These regulations,
however, serve to reemphasize existing regulations as to how
products may be named. Thus, any firm which will be forced to
change the name of its product is now using terms that mis-
29. Land Uses; Wilderness, 56 Fed. Reg. 27,410, 27,417 (codified in final form at
36 C.F.R. pts. 251 & 293).
30. Conservation of Fish and Wildlife and Their Habitat, 56 Fed. Reg. 63,461,
63,463 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 241).
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brand its products, and therefore no legal property right exists.
Thus, no "takings" analysis is necessary."'
31. Regulatory Impact Analysis of the Proposed Rules to Amend the Food Labeling
Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,856, 60,865.
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